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A great variety of theoretical and operational defin itions of 
power appear in the lite ra tu re . This study attempted to 
synthesize the theoretical defin itions and to generate a valid  
operational measure of power. Two coding schemes were generated 
and used to code a one hour simulated bargaining interaction.
The coding results were tested against an objective outcome 
measure and the subjects' self-reports of the re la tive  power of 
the parties in the bargaining session.
Six experienced bargainers from the local community were 
assigned to two three-person groups fo r the bargaining simulation. 
The subjects p rio ritize d  the issues, acted out the bargaining 
simulation, and were interviewed to discover th e ir  perceptions 
of the power dynamics of the bargaining interaction. One week 
la te r  they viewed the videotapes made of the simulation session 
and identified  the power tactics they saw. The f i r s t  coding 
scheme was generated from the post-simulation interview data; 
the second was generated from the videotape viewing session.
Only lim ited r e l ia b i l i ty  was established for the two coding 
schemes. A close correlation was found, however, between 
coder agreement and the objective outcome measure. One 
interesting result was that both teams perceived themselves 
as having won. Future research should focus on refin ing  
participant generated coding categories, examining the role  
of language and nonverbal cues on perceptions of power, and 
determining the varying in tensities of d iffe ren t categories 
of power related behavior.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
I t  has become increasingly clear in recent years that power 
is an integral part of a ll human relationships. Rollo May has pointed 
out that many philosophers have equated power with 'being' (1972). I f  
this is true, then a ll human beings necessarily exert some form of 
power. S im ilarly , Rozinski claims that "power is nothing less than 
an objective quality of a ll re a lity , a quality  inherent in a ll that 
exists . . ." (1965, p. 13). While this philosophical position may 
be a b it  extreme, this study accepts the general assumption that a ll 
persons in a ll relationships exert some power by virtue of th e ir  
participation in human relationships. More simply stated, Frost and 
Wilmot argue that "one cannot not use power" (1978). C learly , i t  is  
impossible to ignore the dynamics of power and its  effects when 
analyzing human relationships.
In addition, most scholars agree that co n flic t is also an 
inherent part of a ll  human relationships (Keltner, 1973 and Frost & 
Wilmot, 1978). In fa c t, co n flic t and power are inextricably tied  
together in human relations. As Duke (1976) argues,
The central core of what we call co n flic t is not
co n flic t at a l l ,  but rather, power  I t  is power
which gives the theory its  unique flavor and which 
represents its  most formidable analytical and 
explanatory to o l. (p. 159)
Raven and Kruglanski (1970) agree that power is a major determinant
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in co n flic t resolution. Thus, no study of any c o n flic t setting is 
complete without an understanding of the power relationships 
involved.
In co llective bargaining a clear understanding of power 
dynamics is particu larly  crucia l. T rad itio na lly , one of the greatest 
sources of d issatisfaction in labor-management relations has been 
the disparity of power between the two parties. In fa c t, co llective  
bargaining was established as common practice in industrial relations  
in order to a lle v ia te  that power disparity (Richardson, 1974). That 
is why Gruder (1970) says
Although the concept of power is basic to a 
discussion of any social influence process nowhere 
is i t  more applicable than in research on in te r­
personal and intergroup negotiations.. . .  In the 
world of formal negotiations, big business, big 
labor, blacks and whites, public employees, and 
aspirants to public o ffice  a ll extol the necessity 
( i f  not the virtues) o f power, (p. 112)
At th is point then, i t  appears axiomatic that power dynamics are a
deciding factor ( i f  not the deciding factor) in negotiating a
resolution to any c o n flic t.
These assumptions, while widely accepted, leave a number of 
questions unanswered. What exactly is power? How does i t  influence 
co n flic t resolution? How is i t  manifested in negotiations? Can 
power be measured? These questions are a ll  important in that 
fundamental power relationships underlie a ll negotiations (Cross, 
1969). Cross points out that while most lite ra tu re  on negotiation 
includes some discussion of bargaining power "there does not appear 
to be anything approaching consensus as to what 'power' is ."  (p. 17). 
This lack of consensus is due to two primary areas of disagreement
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in the lite ra tu re : 1) conceptual defin itions of power are many and
varied and 2) varying theories of social interaction call fo r very 
d iffe ren t defin itions of the concept o f power.
Conceptual Issues
Duke's (1976) discussion of co n flic t and power outlines seven 
important conceptual issues which are sources of confusion or 
disagreement in defining power (pp. 41-41):
1. Power is variously defined as potential fo r social action 
and as a function of actor's bargaining behavior.
2. I t  has been both distinguished from and equated with
force, coercion, persuasion, and influence.
3. I t  has been seen as both assymetrical (one direction of 
influence) and symmetrical (mutual lines of influence).
4. I t  has been associated with both the legitim ate and 
ille g itim a te  use of force.
5. I t  has been seen as a zero-sum quantity a t times and as
a shareable resource at other times.
6. I t  has been described as both a possession or a ttrib u te
of a party and as an available resource at the disposal of a 
party.
7. I t  has also been conceptualized as a general capability  
available in a ll situations and also as a s ituation-specific  
variable.
Each of these areas of potential confusion must be adequately 
addressed and applied spec ifica lly  to the bargaining setting before
4
any useful conclusions can be drawn about the dynamics of power in 
negotiation.
Potential fo r Action v. Actual 
Behavior
Perhaps the most d i f f ic u lt  issue to resolve is whether power 
is a potential fo r action or a variable based on actors1, behavior.
The notion of potential is represented in two'ways in power 
defin ition s . F irs t , are defin itions based on the notion of a b il ity .  
Power is seen by some as the a b ility  to achieve one's w i l l ,  bring 
about one's desires, and/or overcome resistance (Weber, 1943; Duke, 
1976; and Korda, 1975). S im ilarly , Keltner (1973) interprets power 
as "the a b il ity  to control the behavior and eutcome of other persons' 
behavior." (p. 268). Other theorists see power as an a b il i ty  to 
reward or punish an opponent (Raven & Kruglanski, 1970 and Bowers & 
Ochs, 1971).
The view of power as potential is e x p lic it ly  advanced by 
Thibaut and Gruder (1969) and Berger (1980). Berger defines power 
as the potential of one partner to influence the other's behavior 
(1980). Thibaut and Gruder (1969), in a d iffe ren t vein, equate power 
with "threat potential" which is  the a b il ity  to.make one's opponents 
believe that you can and. w ill impose some punishment on them.
Neither a b il ity  nor potential lend themselves easily to objective 
measurement and evaluation. In fa c t, neither concept necessarily has 
any impact on bargaining. Is i t  useful to determine how much power 
a party has. i f  that power is not u tilized? For that.m atter,..is  i t  
even accurate to say that a party has power i f  i t  goes unused?
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These are the questions commonly raised by theorists who 
believe that power is most accurately determined by observing actors' 
behavior. Wilmot, e t. a l .  (1981) states that the best available  
research equates power with conversational control ( i . e . :  who talks
most, who changes the topic , who in terrupts , e tc .) .  This approach 
is represented by the work of Rogers and Farace (1975), Golembiewski 
(1962), and Mischler and Waxier (1968). This approach assumes that 
power emerges from the actions and interaction patterns of conflicting  
parties (Cartwright, 1959 and Turk, 1974). 'This argument supports 
the use of objective coding to determine power as exemplified in the, 
work of Douglas (1957) and Donohue (1978),. More sp e c ifica lly , Dahl 
(1957) and Kipnis (1976) equate-power with the use of threats.
F in a lly , some negotiators view power as a function of bargainers' 
behavior. Karrass (1974) and m .ich  (1980) are two professional 
negotiators who have written "How to . . ." books on how to gain 
power through the use of a variety of bargaining techniques. The 
rationale for the "power as behavior" philosophy is stated concisely 
by Turk (1974):; "since group outcome is a product of a ll parties' 
input group action can be explained only in terms of interactional 
patterns, thus we recognize that individual goals are 'unknowable,' 
and sometimes unknown even to the individual and that outcome is not 
the doing of a single individual or party" (p. 49). Simmel puts i t  
better in arguing that since power has so many dimensions that are 
d i f f ic u lt  to determine, power can only be known through the acting 
out of the c o n flic t (Coser, 1967).
One aspect o f power that is neglected in the potential v_. 
behavior dichotomy is the e ffec t of perception on power. Karrass
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argues that the most s ign ificant aspect of power is the a b il i ty  to 
change the opponent's estimate of one's power (1974). I t  stands to 
reason that A's a b ility  or potential to reward or punish B is ,  at 
least in part, a function of B's perception of that same a b il ity  as 
well as B's perception of his or her own a b il ity  to re ta lia te . In 
addition, A's power behavior can only be effec tive  i f  B perceives 
the behavior as powerful. Apfelbaum (1974) and Berger (1980) prove 
the importance of perception in reviewing a number of studies which 
indicate that actors' perceptions of power relationships and tactics  
do not correlate with trad itio na l source, outcome, and interaction  
measures.
I t  is clear that there is much disagreement about the sources 
and manifestations of power. How these issues may be resolved in 
the study of bargaining power is an issue that w ill be addressed 
la te r  in th is discussion.
Force, Coercion, Influence, and 
Persuasion
Duke (1976) suggests that one of the d iff ic u lt ie s  in defining 
power is the fact that power has been both d ifferen tia ted  from and 
equated with force, coercion, influence, and persuasion. As many 
respected theorists (most notably French & Raven, 1959 and May, 1972) 
have proposed, force and coercion are merely subsets of power. 
Certainly force, at least physical force, is not a bargaining tac tic  
but rather, a ta c tic  used on occasion when bargaining breaks down.
As fo r influence and persuasion, these are means of getting  
one's way. As such they are also forms of power. However, several 
power tactics such as interrupting (Rogers & Farace, 1975) and
bargaining on one's own te rr ito ry  (Chertkoff & Esser, 1976) are not 
persuasive or in flu en tia l per se. Thus, these notions too, are 
simply subsets of power as a whole. In order to study power in its  
fu lle s t sense, th is paper w ill not l im it  the concept by equating i t  
with any of these terms but w ill trea t the notions of force, coercion 
persuasion, and influence as various ways of establishing and/or 
exercising power.
Unidirectional Influence v.
M ultidi recti onal In f1uence
The th ird  issue raised by Duke concerns whether power is 
wielded by one party in a co n flic t or by both. Michael Korda (1975) 
suggests that there are two types of people: 1) the powerful and
2) the powerless. This re flec ts  a view of power as un id irectional. 
Many researchers and theorists re fle c t th is  view and i t  is c learly  
evidenced in the work of Jacobsen (1972) and Swingle (1976) who o ffe r  
a conceptualization of power as "residing in" e ither the source or 
the target of power ta c tic s , but not both.
On the other hand, many theorists argue that a ll parties  
in a relationship exercise some power no-matter how l i t t l e  or how 
ind irect (Kipnis, 1976; Apfelbaum, 1974; and Frost & Wilmot, 1978; 
and others). These writers propose that regardless of the size of 
the power d isparity , a ll  parties in a con flic t w ill find some way 
to exert and exhib it power. An extremely low power individual may 
have to resort to subterfuge (M ille r , 1976 and Safilios-Rothschild, 
1969) but they w ill exercise power even i f  i t  means resorting to 
violence (Duke, 1976).
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Legitimate Use of Force v.
Ille g itim a te  Use of Force
The issue of power as the legitim ate or ille g itim a te  use of 
force is  not applicable to the negotiation setting. In the f i r s t  
place, force is a power technique which is resorted to only when 
bargaining breaks down and even then, only in certain cases. 
Consequently, force is not an appropriate term to describe what goes 
on at the bargaining tab le.
As fo r the notion of legitimacy, legitim ate power is d is­
tinguished from ille g itim a te  power by determining the parties' 
perceptions of the opponent's rig h t to exercise power in a re la tio n ­
ship (Duke, 1976), More sp ec ifica lly , legitim ate power is the 
exercise of power over another, who believes that one has the righ t 
to exercise such power. Conversely, ille g itim a te  power is the 
exercise of power over another, who does not believe that one has 
the righ t to exercise that power. In a bargaining situation the 
parties are generally free to exchange proposals and to accept or 
re jec t them as they see f i t .  In looking at the behavior of the 
parties, there is no way of determining what each parties' assessment 
of the other's rights are unless they make an e x p lic it statement such 
as: "You have no righ t to make such a demand." In the absence of
such an e x p lic it statement i t  can only be assumed that a power move 
has been accepted as legitim ate.
Zero-sum v  ̂ Shareable Resource
Another d i f f ic u lt  issue is whether power is a zero-sum 
resource or not. I f  i t  is ,  then any increase in one party 's; 
power necessitates a decrease in the power of others. The major
9
determinant in resolving this issue is the d e fin ition  of power one 
uses. C learly , one's defin ition  of power w ill determine whether i t  
can be shared or not. For example, i f  power is equated with "who 
gets his way" (outcome), then the party who gets i t  has power and the 
party who does not, has no power. S im ilarly , to the extent that 
power is a function of the actors' perceptions, there is a tendency 
for the parties to see i t  as a zero-sum quantity. That is , i f  A 
believes that a particu lar move has increased her or his power, she 
or he w ill tend to believe that B's power is reduced.
However, i f  power is conceived as a function of the parties' 
a b ilit ie s  or th e ir  behavior, then i t  is a shareable resource. Both 
parties, fo r instance, have some potential a b il ity  to influence 
others (Frost & Wilmot, 1978). In addition, both parties are capable 
of interrupting the other or changing the topic, thus indicating an 
exercise of power (Rogers & Farace, 1975). Consequently, the issue 
remains unresolved. The question of whether or not power is a 
shareable resource in the bargaining setting w ill be c la r if ie d  la te r .
Possession or A ttribute v.
Available Resource r
Another point of disagreement in power defin itions involves
the question of whether power is something one "has" or is simply
available for use. The former position is most c learly  stated and
supported by Korda (1975). He proposes that people are of two
types—the powerful and the powerless. The implication of this
»
approach is that some have i t  and some do not. Thus power is a 
possession or a ttrib u te  of certain powerful types..
In contrast, many theorists regard power as an available  
resource. Those who support a re lational approach argue that power 
energies from the relationship between the parties (Coser, 1967; 
Golembiewski, 1962; and Frost & Wilmot, 1978). This approach implies
that power is  at the disposal of e ither party. In other words,
e ither party can establish or increase th e ir power i f  they are aware 
of the factors that a ffec t the power dynamics of the relationship. 
Power defin itions emphasizing the notion of a b il ity  or potential 
support a view of power as an available resource. I t  may be that 
some dimensions of power are (or at least appear to be) possessions 
of a party while other dimensions are available and emerge from the 
interaction of the parties. This notion w ill be explored in greater 
detail la te r .
General Capability v. Situation  
Specific Variable
The fin a l conceptual issue to be resolved is quite sim ilar 
to the 'a ttr ib u te  v̂  available resource' issue. I f  power is a 
possession or a ttrib u te  of certain powerful-individuals, then i t  can
be said to be a general capability  across situations for that person.
I f ,  on the other hand, power is a function of available resources 
(whether they be money, persuasive a b il i t ie s , a ffection , e tc . ) ,  then 
i t  must be situation specific . This must be so because the re la tive  
power is a function of both parties ' perceptions, behaviors, and 
values (Coser, 1967; Schelling, 1970;. and Bacharach & Lawler, 1980), 
which change from time to timeand from situation to s ituation .
Although Duke (1976) does not discuss any of the conceptual 
issues he has id en tified , a review of the lite ra tu re  illu s tra te s  that
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various authors define power in very d iffe ren t ways. I t  appears that 
two of these issues are irre levant in determining a useful defin ition  
of bargaining power. Furthermore, at least two other issues 
(behavior _v. potential v. perception and zero-sum v_. shareable 
resource) are crucial to a clear understanding of bargaining power. 
This study w ill attempt to reconcile these problematic issues in 
defining power. In order to do so there must also be some synthesis 
of the various theoretical approaches to power because each of the 
major theoretical orientations to social interaction requires a 
d iffe ren t defin ition  of power.
Theoretical Orientations
Various theories propose d ifferin g  dimensions of social 
in teraction , each suggesting a d iffe ren t view of power. The most 
widely accepted theoretical orientations are: 1) f ie ld  theory,
2) social exchange theory, 3) coalition theory, 4) the interaction  
approach, 5) the psychological theories, and 6) the mathematical/ 
probabilities model. Each of these theories w ill be b r ie fly  outlined 
in terms of its  fundamental assumptions and the defin itions of power 
that stem from those assumptions.
Field Theory
Field theory states that there are six bases of power which 
may be tapped by any or a ll parties in a co n flic t (French & Raven,
1959 and Raven, 1965). These six bases of power are: 1) reward
power--the a b il ity  to provide others with needed or desired benefits, 
2) coercive power--the a b il ity  to punish others for noncompliance
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with one's wishes, 3) information power--providing others with in fo r­
mation with convinces them to change th e ir thinking or behaving in a 
desired d irection, 4) legitim ate power by position*-power one has by 
virtue of the rank or position held in an organization, 5) expert 
power--power one has by virtue of being the most knowledgeable person 
on a particu lar subject, and 6) referent power--power given to some­
one because they are w e ll-lik ed . Power, then, from this perspective, 
depends on one's a b il ity  to show, or a t least convince, another that 
one can reward or punish, has persuasive information, has the righ t 
to induce change, is an expert, or is likeable and should be emulated 
or obeyed.
Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory is based on two fundamental assumptions. 
F irs t is the assumption that people in teract with each other on the 
basis of the re la tiv e  rewards and costs involved in the relationship  
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959 and Homans, 1974). That is , they tend to 
in teract and develop relationships with people who can provide them 
with some benefits, usually in the form of need satisfaction. In 
addition, people assess the costs of maintaining a particu lar 
relationship. As long as the;‘potential rewards exceed the costs of 
maintaining the relationship, a person is lik e ly  to stick with i t .
The greater the reward/cost ra tio , the more lik e ly  the relationship  
w ill continue (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). With th is assumption in 
mind, theorists have concluded that power is associated with the 
a b ility  to provide rewards and impose costs (much lik e  fie ld  theory). 
That is , A w ill have power over B to the extent that A can reward B
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fo r doing what A wants or punish B for not doing what A wants.
The second assumption of social exchange theory concerns the 
issue of dependence. A's power over B is equal to B's dependence 
upon A (Emerson, 1962; Blau, 1964; and Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). B 
is dependent upon A to the extent that B's need satisfaction (rewards) 
can only be achieved through his or her relationship with A. That 
is ,  i f  A controls resources that B needs and B has no a lternative  
source for those resources, then B is to ta lly  dependent upon A. I t  
stands to reason that i f  B has several a lternative  sources of rewards, 
he or she is less dependent upon ‘A and thus A has less power over B 
(Blau, 1964). One additional variable in this power/dependence 
approach is that B's a lternative  sources may be fa r  less a ttra c tive  
than A because, although they can provide needed resources, the 
reward/cost ra tio  may be much smaller than the ra tio  in the A-B 
relationship. I f  th is is the case, and A knows i t  to be the case, 
then B's dependence and A's power remain high.
Coalition Theory
Coalition theory is prim arily concerned with the hows and 
whys: of coalition formation (Gamson, 1964 and Caplow, 1968). However, 
the key aspect of coalition  formation, fo r the purposes of th is paper, 
is the power enhancing function. I f  one party is in a low power 
position alone, they may jo in  forces with other parties in the hopes 
that th e ir combined strength w ill be su ffic ien t to impose th e ir w ill 
or to res is t the power attempts of the other party. This approach 
might be called the strength in numbers approach to power.
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Interaction Approach
The interaction approach is founded on the assumption that
re la tiv e  strength can only be determined through the acting out of
a con flic t (Coser, 1967). Following this assumption, Douglas (1957)
states that there is a
need for a model of in teractive behavior which w ill 
explain how the orig inal sources of form and energy 
which are introduced at the table are transformed 
into a system of "table power" which can e ffec t the 
settlement of disputes, (p. 81)
Many theorists and researchers have advanced and tested this approach
by counting interruptions, ta lk  time, topic changes, and other
countable or codable behaviors (Golembiewski, 1962; Mischler &
Waxier, 1968; Donohue, 1978; and Rogers & Farace, 1975). This approach
to power equates i t  with e ither certain types of behavior or certain
patterns of behavior.
Psychological Theories
The so-called psychological theories of bargaining—face 
saving theory, equity theory, a ttribu tion  theory, and level of 
aspiration theory—suggest that the outcome of bargaining is 
determined by the psychological and personality factors that 
bargainers bring to the table with them (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960; 
Walster, 1976; Zartman, 1977; and Spector, 1977). Equity and 
attribu tion  theory assume that parties w ill target an equitable 
solution as lying approximately halfway between the two opening 
offers . Power from th is perspective, is a function of fairness or 
moral force in that a bargainer who makes a concession exerts some 
form of social power on his or her opponent because the opponent
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should make the next concession. I t  is the socia l-eth ical pressure 
to trade concessions and reach a solution roughly halfway between the 
in it ia l  positions that constitutes power according to these theories.
Face saving theory and level of aspiration theory deal with 
the parties ' psychological reactions to the bargaining. The 
bargainers are assumed to react to the concession-making behavior o f  
th e ir  opponent. For instance, the smaller A's concessions are, the 
lower B's aspirations w ill be. Power is evidenced by making small 
concessions and making them only in response to concessions made by 
one's opponent (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960). These two tactics are the 
signs of high aspirations.
Mathematical/Probabilities 
Model
The fin a l theoretical orientation of in terest to this study 
assumes that power is  a function of set mathematical relations among 
the determinants of power (Rapoport, 1963 and 1970; and Walton & 
McKersie, 1968). I t  is assumed that the probability of successfully 
exercising power can be determined by using mathematical formulae. 
Simply put, power is the difference between the probability that an 
opponent w ill change before one's e ffo rts  to bring about a change and 
the probability that she or he w ill change a fte r  one's efforts  to 
induce change (Cavanaugh, et. a l . ,  1980). The greater the difference 
between these two probabilities (in  favor of the la t te r )  the greater 
the power one exercises.
Theoretical orientations to social interchange and power call 
fo r d ras tica lly  d iffe ren t defin itions and conceptualizations of power. 
The task of bringing together these diverse notions is a d i f f ic u lt
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one. Theoretically, speaking, power may be seen as reward and 
punishment potentia l; access to desirable a lternatives; possession 
and/or perceptions of expertise, information, legitim acy, e tc . ; 
coalition formation; specific interaction types and patterns; 
psychological orientations toward fairness and/or high aspirations; 
and as a matter of sh ifting probab ilities . In following these various 
theoretical orientations, unfortunately, research on power in bar­
gaining has not provided a unified direction fo r p ractitioners , 
theorists, or future researchers.
Increasing scholarly in terest in power has been evidenced 
by a number of lite ra tu re  reviews comparing power theories'(Zartman, 
1977 and Cavanaugh, e t. a l . ,  1980), power research (S a filio s -  
Rothschild, 1969; Turk and B e ll, "1972; Hadley & Jacob, 1973; and 
Turk, 1974), and both (Apfelbaum, 1974; Berger, 1980; and Bacharach 
and Lawler, 1980).
Reviews of theory in family power and in bargaining suggest 
that participants' perceptions of a re la tiv e  power relationship w ill 
not be the same as objective observers' estimations of who has 
power. By and large the research upholds th is finding. In fa c t, 
power research is plagued by four fundamental d if f ic u lt ie s :  1) there 
is l i t t l e  agreement as to what power is (Turk, 1974; Duke, 1976; 
and Berger, 1980), 2) some studies assume that parties hold "equal 
power" in i t ia l ly  while others assume the opposite and manipulate 
the power d isparity (Apfelbaum, 1974), 3) there is l i t t l e  agreement 
as to how to measure power (Apfelbaum, 1974; M ille r , e t. a l . ,  1977; 
Kipnis, e t. a l . ,  1980; and Berger, 1980), and 4) there is ample 
evidence that existing measures of power do not correlate (Kenkel,
1963; Olson, 1969; Turk & B e ll, 1972; Hadley & Jacob, 1973; and 
Folger & S illa rs , 1977).
Consequently, despite the vast amount of lite ra tu re  published 
on power in the las t 30 years, there is s t i l l  l i t t l e  agreement as to 
what power is conceptually, th eoretica lly , or operationally. This 
study w ill attempt to synthesize these varying approaches to power 
by reconciling the theoretical and conceptual issues as much as 
possible. In addition, i t  w ill identify  the major methodological 
d iff ic u lt ie s  that plague bargaining research and suggest a research 
design that w ill y ie ld  answers to some nagging questions about 
bargaining power. In short, the author plans to discover the 
unifying elements in the diverse approaches to power and to design 
and carry out a study which makes use of the most up-to-date 
methodology fo r identifying the dimensions and dynamics of power 
in the context of bargaining.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Conceptual and theoretical approaches to defining and studying 
power are so diverse as to lead the researcher into a state of u tter  
confusion. Bargaining theory in the area o f power suffers from three 
major problems
1. The. factors mediating power relationships are v ir tu a lly  
impossible to measure or quantify.
2. The theoretical relationships between possible variables 
and mediating factors are not c learly explicated.
3. Most theories are so broad and/or imprecise that 
v ir tu a lly  any empirical findings can be construed as support fo r  
any particu lar theory
Given these severe lim itations and the generally confused 
condition of power theory and research, attempting a synthesis of 
theories and methods is  a formidable task. I t  is a task however, 
which must be undertaken i f  we are to make any practical use of the 
concept of power in the future. This paper w ill attempt such a 
synthesis in two main sections. F irs t, the theoretical and conceptual 
issues w ill be addressed. The common elements of the d iffe ren t 
theories w ill provide a central core for a unified de fin ition  of 
power. Then the differences w ill be iden tified  and explained so 
that a comprehensive view of power can be proposed with confidence.
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Second, a review of the various measurement issues and problems w ill 
be offered. Since each of the extant approaches ,to the measurement 
of power is assumed to have some degree of v a lid ity  and r e l ia b i l i t y ,  
none should be discarded lig h tly . The strengths and weaknesses of 
each approach must be carefu lly  considered and the best available  
methods must be used in such a way as to reduce th e ir  inherent 
weaknesses to a minimum.
Theoretical/Conceptual Issues
The six major theoretical explanations of power in human 
in teraction each ca ll fo r a very d iffe ren t perspective on defining 
power. However, i f  these perspectives are viewed in lig h t of the 
seven conceptual issues iden tified  by Duke (1976), several simi­
la r it ie s  reveal themselves. The clear id en tifica tion  of a set of 
s im ila ritie s  and differences w ill fa c il i ta te  a clearer delineation of 
the dimensions of power in the bargaining context. In addition, the 
id en tifica tio n  of certain s im ila ritie s  across theories w ill 
s ig n ifican tly  reduce the number of d isparities  which must be accounted 
fo r. So, each of the six theories w ill be discussed with special 
attention given to the implications of the theory in resolving the 
conceptual issues associated with the de fin ition  of power.
Field Theory
Field theory deals with power as a potential a b il ity  of 
actor's in a co n flic t as well as a function of actors' perceptions. 
French and Raven (1959) o rig in a lly  proposed the existence of five  
bases of power: reward, coercive, expert, leg itim ate, and referent.
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Some years la te r , Raven (1965) added a sixth power base to the l is t :  
information power.
Kaplan (1964) expanded the theory to include three dimensions
of power which delim it each power base. F irs t is the weight of the
power, or the amount of control one has (size of reward or punishment, 
amount of expertise, information, e tc .) to induce a specific behavior. 
Second is the domain of power, or the number of persons or groups over 
which one can exercise one's power. The las t dimension is the scope 
of power, or the number of d iffe ren t kinds of behavior one can exert 
influence over fo r any given individual or group.
This particu lar theoretical approach does l i t t l e  to resolve 
the question of whether power is a function of actors' potential 
a b il i t ie s ,  th e ir perceptions, or th e ir behavior. Dahl (1957) argues 
that the bases of power are passive and must be evoked through some 
means (some type of behavior). Raven and Krug!anski (1970) support 
th is notion in that they id en tify  a variety of ways in which each 
power base might be manifested in actors' behavior. These theorists 
believe that the bases of power themselves hold a potential fo r power 
but that power must be manifested in behavior.
This approach is upheld, in part, by Cavanaugh, Larson,
Goldberg & Bellows (1980) in th e ir review of power theories. They 
suggest that these six bases of power represent two d iffe ren t 
approaches. F irs t , reward, coercion, and information power represent 
the a b il ity  of an actor to influence the behavior of another. On 
the other hand, they say that leg itim ate, referent, and expert power 
are dependent upon the target's  perception of the other. Consequently, 
f ie ld  theory provides no resolution to the potential v_. perception v̂ .
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behavior issue. I t  does, however, o ffe r a more unified approach to
i ' ■
some of the other conceptual issues.
Field theory strongly supports the notion that power is 
m ultid irectional. That is , both parties have the capacity and/or the-; 
means to influence the other. This is most c learly  exemplified by 
Raven and Kruglanski (1970). They construct scenarios from extant 
research illu s tra tin g  the effects of the use of power by both parties. 
They explain that the bases of power are often used reciprocally, 
since one party's influence attempts are lik e ly  to be met by counter
t
influence tactics from the other party.
S im ilarly , power is viewed as shareable in th is  theoretical 
approach. Both parties may have the a b il ity  to reward and punish the 
other, as well as access to in fluen tia l information. In addition, 
both parties may be seen as likeable and knowledgeable, although i t  
is unlikely that these qualities  w ill appear to be equal to the 
parties. Although legitimacy is usually a function of t i t l e  or 
position in an organization (thus giving the higher status individual 
a greater amount of power), this is not always true in the bargaining 
context.
In an organization, two parties of equal status may come into 
co n flic t in which case th e ir  legitimacy can be viewed in three ways:
1) neither party may see the other as having the righ t to influence 
th e ir behavior, 2) both parties may see the other as having the right 
to influence th e ir  behavior, or 3) one party may grant the other 
legitimacy while the other party does not return the courtesy. In the 
f i r s t  case legitimacy is not an issue while in the second, both parties 
could be said to have legitim ate power. Only in the las t case is
legitim ate power unid irectional. In the bargaining context, the 
parties are engaging in a structured communication event characterized 
by provisional offers and counteroffers, none of which become fina l 
until accepted by a ll parties involved (Chertkoff & Esser, 1976).
Thus, i t  is clear that a ll parties in co llective bargaining have a 
"right" to influence the others toward accepting an optimal agreement.
The fourth conceptual issue in question is easily  resolved 
from the standpoint of f ie ld  theory. Power is viewed not as an 
attrib u te  or possession o f e ither party, but rather, as an available  
resource for both parties. Raven and Kruglanski state that comflict 
resolution is determined by the amount and type of power "at the 
disposal" of the conflicting parties (1970). S im ilarly , the a b ility  
to reward, punish, and provide information suggest that these power 
bases are also at the disposal of the parties and not actually  
possessed by them. The leg itim ate, expert, and referent power bases 
also must be considered available resources. They are not possessions 
since they do not reside in the powerholder. Instead they are given 
to her or him by the other party(s) in the c o n flic t. Once again 
legitimacy can be considered as an a ttrib u te  however, the low power 
party can always deny the legitimacy of the higher power party’s 
influence attempts (Duke, 1976 and Karrass, 1974).
F in a lly , f ie ld  theory assumes that power is situation specific  
as opposed to a general capab ility . A b ility , perception, weight, 
scope, and domain are a ll properties of a particu lar social 
relationship (Cavanaugh, e t. a l . , 1980). Rewards and punishments which 
are useful against one opponent may prove useless against another i f  
the la tte r  does not value what one has to o ffe r or fear one's coercive
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a b ilit ie s . Information and expertise which might be convincing and 
superior to that of one opponent might be meaningless and in fe rio r  
in re lation to the knowledge and expertise of another. In addition, 
the re la tive  status (legitim acy) and level of attraction  (referent) 
are wholly dependent upon the particu lar individuals in a given social 
relationship.
In summary, f ie ld  theory conceptualizes power in terms of 
its  base (or source), weight, domain, and scope. These dimensions 
grow out of the social relationship between the particu lar other(s) 
involved. Power is characterized as 1) a potential of the parties , 
and a function of th e ir  perceptions and behaviors, 2) m ultidirectional 
(exercised by both p a rties ), 3) shareable (available to both p a rties ), 
and 5) dependent upon and specific to the particu lar situation and 
re la tion sh ip (s ).
Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory is one of the most widely accepted 
explanations of social in teraction. This broad theory has given rise  
to four d iffe ren t perspectives on the study of power which might 
loosely be termed economic approaches—exchange, control of resources, 
power-dependence, and outcome. All four approaches use some form of 
economic metaphor to explain how humans in teract and establish or 
exercise power. The exchange approach assumes that people assess 
relationships in terms of p ro f it—high rewards y_- l ° w costs. Power is  
attributed to the party who can derive the greatest benefits for the 
lowest cost. The control of resources approach attributes power to 
persons who control scarce resources desired by others. The power-
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dependence approach also attributes power to one who is the sole
source of desired benefits--or at least one who offers those benefits
'  •* *
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at the lowest cost. The lack of a lternative sources of desired 
benefits increases dependence and decreases power. -The outcome ' /  
approach attributes power to persons who can" achieve th e ir  desired 
otucomes (maximum rewards) at the lowest cost.
Social exchange theory, then, is based on four basic 
assumptions:
1. Actors choose and maintain relationships which provide 
maximum benefits and require minimum costs.
2. Actors have a comparison level for relationships (CL)
which is a standard for judging how a ttractive  or satisfactory a
relationship is . That is , they ask whether the relationship provides 
at least minimal rewards for an acceptable cost.
3. They also have a comparison level fo r alternatives  
(C Lalt). This is the least p ro fit  a person w ill accept in a 
relationship in lig h t of the p ro fit  available in a lternative re la ­
tionship, s
4. Power is "the capability  one person has of affecting  
another's outcomes in an interpersonal relationship" (Gruder, 1970, 
p. 113). These outcomes are measured in terms of reward/cost ratios. 
Although each of the four perspectives stemming from the theory d iffe r  
in th e ir  emphasis, they are quite sim ilar in the way they attempt to 
resolve the various conceptual issues in question.
Social exchange theory, lik e  fie ld  theory, does l i t t l e  to
resolve the question of whether power is a function of the parties'
a b ilit ie s  and/or perceptions, or is manifested in the parties,'
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behavior. The issue remains problematic. From the exchange 
perspective i t  is clear that the a b ility  to impose costs and o ffer  
rewards is a function of both parties' potentia l. However, the 
rea lization  of. th is potential is dependent upon the target's  perception 
of the value of the rewards and/or costs and his or her perception 
that the influence agent, in fa c t, controls the resources necessary to 
carry out her or his threats or promises (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; 
Watzlawick, 1976; and Schelling, 1970). The control of resources 
perspective supports these same arguments with the additional 
argument that power is manifested in the actual provision or retraction  
of desired resources. Thus, behavior plays a part in power dynamics. 
The exchange perspective implies a crucial lin k  between behavior and 
perception in the claim that power strategies can be e ffec tive  by 
merely "manipulating the other personas perception without any change 
in the objective conditions of interdependency." (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959; p. 122). Thus, in terms of the exchange and control of resources 
perspectives, access to and control over desired rewards and resources 
constitute a potential source of power for conflicting parties. 
Perception* however, also plays a part in that each party places some 
subjective value on those rewards, costs, and resources such that they 
view power quite d iffe re n tly  in some instances. Furthermore, the 
parties ' in teractive behavior w ill influence th e ir perceptions of the 
balance of costs and rewards thus altering  the power relationship to 
some extent.
The power-dependence perspective draws these same conclusions 
but uses a d iffe ren t Tine of reasoning to support them. This 
perspective equates power with dependence. Dependence is a function
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of: 1) the perceived value of the outcomes the other party can o ffer
and 2) the a v a ila b ility  of those outcomes outside the relationship  
in question (Emerson, 1962). Thus, A has power to the extent that B 
perceives that she or he w ill p ro fit from the relationship with A. 
Moreover, i f  B has no a lternative source for the outcomes A provides 
then A's power is further increased. F in a lly , the in teractive  
behavior of A and B can a ffec t th e ir power relationship in that one 
party may be able to persuade the other that the outcomes offered are 
of greater value than o rig in a lly  thought. For example, A may act as 
though his own resources are extremely desirable, thus altering  the 
power relationship (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980).
The outcome perspective, unlike the others, is oriented 
prim arily toward behavior as a determinant of power. The assumption 
is that whoever gets the most desirable outcome has the most power 
(Gruder, 1970). Perception plays a secondary role in that i t  is the 
parties ' perceptions of the reward/cost ratios that determines what 
the most desirable outcome is . Thibaut and Kelley (1959) equate 
power with the potential to a ffec t another's outcomes but the fin a l 
determinant is the actual choices one makes and the impact those 
choices have on the other's outcomes.
The social exchange perspectives assume that power is  
m ultidirectional in that both parties exercise influence. The one 
exception to this general assumption is the outcome perspective. 
Although i t  is generally argued that outcomes are the product of 
the interaction of both parties , theoretically  an outcome matrix 
could be constructed which offered the same outcome to one party no 
matter what choices were made, thus putting a ll the power for
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determining outcome under A's control. Theoretically, such a matrix 
is  possible but re a lis t ic a lly  i t  is rare, i f  indeed i t  exists at a ]1 
in human relationships.
For the most part, direction of influence in social exchange 
theory is founded in the notion of power and counterpower (Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959). This notion assumes that for every power attempt made 
by A, B can o ffe r some resistance or counterpower (imposing costs, 
offering rewards, e tc .) .  "In any dyad. . . . Each one has some power 
over the other which places lim its  on the extent to which each may 
with impunity exercise power over his colleague" (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959, p. 124).. Consequently, i t  is assumed that both parties are 
exerting influence in the relationship.
This theory also supports the concept of power as a 
shareable resource. That is , both parties are capable of imposing 
costs and rewards of some kind. I f  both parties did not control 
some resource(s) desired by the other, then there would be no 
relationship according to the basic tenets of social exchange theory. 
All parties in a relationship are dependent on the other(s) fo r some 
desired outcome (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Consequently, a l l  parties  
have some power. Even in a case where A has complete control over 
B's outcome and B has no control over A 's , i t  is assumed that A is  
dependent upon the relationship for something (such-as his need to 
control others). I f ,  however, A gains an‘outcome or reward a t B's 
expense, then power could be considered to be a zero-sum quantity. 
Nevertheless, power is seen as being shared by the parties on the 
whole.
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The d iffe ren t social exchange perspectives o ffe r two
d iffe ren t views of the nature of power. While a ll  four perspectives
can be said to support the notion of power as an available resource,
two perspectives also imply that power can be a possession of one
»
party or another. The a b il ity  to influence outcomes, perceptions, 
cost/reward ra tio s , and d istribution  of resources is available to 
any and a ll parties in a relationship (p a rtic u la rly  in a bargaining 
re lationsh ip ). However, the exchange and control o f resources 
perspectives propose an additional conceptualization of power. Both 
these approaches allow fo r a d e fin ition  of power as a possession.
Power is described as a possession which can be used up by the 
possessor such that she or he may make no further demands nor induce 
further changes in the other's behavior (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).
One may possess money or goods which, i f  they are desired resources, 
must be equated with power under the basic assumptions of social 
exchange theory. Conversely, Emerson (1962) argues that "power is a 
property of the social re la tion ; i t  is not an a ttrib u te  of an actor" 
(P. 32).
F ina lly , the social exchange perspectives require that power 
be viewed as situation specific rather than a general capab ility .
Aside from the fact that money and affection might be considered 
universally desired resources, i f  Emerson (1962) is righ t about power 
growing out of a social relationship , then every d iffe ren t re la ­
tionship w ill have d iffe ren t power dynamics. Even money and 
affection may be worthless currencies in a given relationship i f  the 
parties ' desired outcomes were increased knowledge, fo r example.
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Social exchange theory, then, offers four approaches to the 
d efin ition  and conceptualization of power. These approaches 
universally agree that: 1) power is determined by a combination of
the actors' behavior, po ten tia l, and perceptions; 2) i t  is exercised 
by a ll  parties in a relationship , at least to some extent; and 3) i t  
is a s itua tion a lly  specific variable which is determined by the 
relationship between the particular parties in question. The main 
point o f disagreement involves the question of whether power is an 
attrib u te  or possession of the powerful party or whether i t  is  
simply a resource available to the parties. Another point of 
disagreement is the question of whether power is shareable or zero-, 
sum.
With respect to the bargaining context in particu lar; these 
two seemingly contradictory conceptualizations can be accommodated 
by bargaining theory. Walton and McKersie (1965) iden tify  two types 
of bargaining— integrative and d is trib u tive . In integrative  
bargaining, creative outcomes may be found which benefit a ll  parties 
concerned. Power, then, is a shareable resource. In d is tribu tive  
bargaining, fixed resources must be divided up so th at, at least 
from the outcome perspective, power is zero-sum ( i . e . :  A's gain is
B's loss). As for the possession ^, available resource issue, power 
is a possession of the bargaining parties in that management controls 
the monetary resources and labor controls the manpower and produc­
t iv i ty  resources. Both sides, however, have the available means to 
impose costs, grant rewards, red istribute resources, e ffec t the 
balance of interdependence, and influence the fin a l outcome of the 
bargaining.
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Coalition Theory
A th ird  theoretical approach to the explanation of power 
dynamics is coalition  theory. This theory is intended to predict 
the way in which m ultiple parties w ill jo in  forces to gain desired 
outcomes (Gamson, 1965). The search for desired outcomes is carried  
out by the parties by combining resources with other parties such 
that the co a lition 's  combined resources are su ffic ien t to gain a 
desired reward. This theory is actually'an offshoot of social 
exchange theory but i t  is discussed separately here because i t  is  
particu larly  relevant to the bargaining context. This is so in that 
labor and management bargaining groups represent coalitions of 
in terest ( i . e . ,  each union is made up of a variety of workers who 
represent many d iffe ren t factions within the union as a whole and 
management is actually a collection of d iffe ren t departments, 
branches, and, a t times, subsidiaries, whose interests are often as 
diverse as they are s im ila r).
This theory offers two basic approaches to the de fin ition  
and determination of power. F irs t, power is seen as the absolute 
amount of resources controlled by a coa lition . This view is  
consistent with Zartman's defin ition  of p o litic a l power. He states 
that p o litic a l power is a function of numbers--if one forms a big 
enough co a lition , one wins (1977). * This is exemplified by the 
give and take of p o lit ic a l conventions.' Each party in each state 
can be said to control a certain number of votes for a particular 
candidate. By making concessions to enough in terest groups and 
factions, one candidate w ill develop a coalition large enough to 
win the nomination. Two consequences of th is approach are: 1) the
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faction contributing the most resources to the coalition w ill demand 
the largest share of the rewards acquired by the coalition as a 
whole (Gamson, 1965), and 2) the faction with the most resources w ill 
be the most sought a fte r  coalition partner. Either way, greater 
resources equals greater power.
The second explanation of how power is determined contradicts 
the f i r s t ,  at least in part. I t  is founded on the concept of pivotal 
power (Gamson, 1965). This notion argues that power is not a function 
of in i t ia l  resources. Instead, "a player's pivotal power is the 
proportion of times his resources can change a losing coalition into 
a winning one" (Gamson, 1964, p. 89). Thus, even a party with 
re la tiv e ly  few resources may have pivotal power i f  one or more 
stronger parties or coalitions need those resources to gain th e ir  
desired outcome(s). In a situation such as this the weak party and 
the strong party have equal pivotal power because each is needed 
by the other in order to form a winning coalition .
These two explanations of how power is determined give rise  
to an interesting assumption mady by a lit io n  theorists. I t  is 
assumed that people w ill favor the "cheapest winning coalition"  
(Gamson, 1965). That is , they w ill form the smallest coalition  
necessary to achieve a satisfactory outcome. In doing so each 
member of the coalition w ill maximize th e ir  proportion of the to ta l 
outcome. This gives rise  to the "strength is weakness" paradox of 
coalition theory (Gamson, 1964). The strongest faction w ill be the 
least desirable partner because they w ill command the largest share 
of the fin a l rewards (Gamson, 1964 and 1965 and Hartman, 1976).
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Coalition theory, then, sees power as a function of potential 
fo r coalition formation (pivotal power) as well.:as behavior (the  
actual formation of a c o a litio n ). In addition, Caplow (1968) states 
that parties' perceptions have an influence on the power relationship. 
He argues that three parties with equal pivotal power may maintain 
a balance of power in order to remain autonomous. In such a 
situation , the only thing preventing a re la tiv e ly  strong party from 
exercising power over a weaker party is the perception that i f  such 
a power move is attempted, the weaker opponent w ill or may form a 
winning coalition with the th ird  party. Consequently, power can be 
the possib ility  of coalition  formation, the perception that two or 
more others w ill form a co a litio n , and/or the act of forming a 
coalition .
Power from this theoretical viewpoint is m ultid irectional.
Any party may form a coalition  or at least give the impression that 
she or he intends to. For example, a union may e n lis t the aid of 
another union in staging a slowdown or walkout. In bargaining, 
particu larly  in the public sector, both sides attempt to form a 
coalition  of sorts with the public in order to gain the valuable 
resource known as "public opinion." As previously mentioned, union 
and management bargaining groups are already coalitions which • 
represent larger coalitions. Consequently, i t  cannot be said that 
coalition  power is unidirectional.
Furthermore, power in this sense must also be shareable.
Both (or a l l )  parties have an equal opportunity to gather support 
fo r th e ir position from within th e ir ranks as well as from outside 
sources. While one party may be more lik e ly  to form a coalition or
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have more opportunities to do so, this does not eliminate the 
opportunities of the other to seek out and develop coalitions of 
its  own.
Power may be seen as both a possession and an available  
resource from the point of view of coalition theory. .Since both 
sides are, in fa c t, coalitions already, i t  can,.be said that the 
parties possess the strength of numbers to some extent. However, 
i f  we consider public opinion, for example, as a resource then i t  
can only be seen as an available resource and not as a possession of 
one party because public opinion changes with the circumstances.
F in a lly , there is some d if f ic u lty  in determining whether 
power is a general capab ility  or a situation specific variable.
One could argue that any party is always^capable of joining up with 
some outside source of additional resources, thus they are generally 
capable of gaining power through coalition formation. On the other 
hand, power w ill be determined by the particu lar outcomes desired by 
the parties and the particu lar resources necessary to achieve those 
outcomes. In co llec tive  bargaining, management always controls 
economic resources (wages) and labor always controls productivity  
resources (the work fo rce). The amount of money and the size of 
the work force, however, is in constant flu x . Consequently, every 
d iffe ren t situation w ill ca ll for d iffe ren t amounts of resources and 
subsequent changes in the pivotal power of the parties.
In conclusion, power, as defined by coalition theory is 
determined by the amount of resources one has re la tiv e  to the amount 
of resources held by and available to a ll  other interested parties.
As such, power is: 1) exhibited in the parties' behavior or seen as
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a potential resource tempered by the perception of one's opponent(s); 
2) exercised by a l l  parties in a relationship; 3) shared, to some 
extent, by a ll  parties; 4) both a possession of the parties (a t 
least in the bargaining context) and an available resource; and 
5) determined by the particu lar situation in which the parties find  
themselves. I t  should be noted that in the bargaining context the 
bargaining groups themselves do not form coalitions except in the 
sense that they try  to gain the support of most ( i f  not a l l )  of th e ir  
constituents for the decisions they make at the bargaining table.
They may refer to support given to them by outside groups but they 
do not bring more people to the bargaining table in order to overwhelm 
the opposing team with sheer numbers.
Psychological Theories
Psychological theories of power are founded on two funda­
mental approaches to the psychological dynamics of interpersonal 
re lations. The f i r s t  focuses on the psychological state of the 
source of the influence attempt and the second focuses on the target 
of such attempts.
According to Kipnis (1976) power is a game with certain  
incremental and necessary steps.
1. A person experiences an aroused need state.
2. The individual musters the necessary resources to 
influence another.
3. F in a lly , the individual takes action to satisy his or 
her need.
He argues that we must analyze the resources and the psychological
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state of the power user.
Both units of information are needed to predict- 
the behavior of the power holder since the combination 
of an aroused power need and the possession of'resources 
can be expected to lead to action, while the absence 
of e ither w ill lead to inaction. (K ipnis, 1976, p. 38)„
Furthermore, the in d iv idua l' s a tt itu d e  toward the influence target
w ill determine the choice of power tactics (Michener & Schwertfeger,
1972). I f  the target is w e ll-lik e d , then value-change tactics are
more lik e ly  to be used. I f  the target is disliked i t  is lik e ly  that
destructive tactics w ill be used. " Michener and Schwertfeger add that
nondestructive tactics may also result from a fear of destructive
re ta lia tio n  or strong counterinfluence (1972). Influence attempts
then, are the resu lt of an aroused need which can only be met by
inducing behavior in others, the perception that one has su ffic ien t
resources to influence successfully, and choices made based on one's
attitu de  toward the influence target.
The second approach focuses more on the need state of the 
target. Spector explains:
A person employing power is imposing driving and 
restraining forces on the l i f e  space of another 
individual to induce change in the target's  valence 
fo r various goal objects. (Spector, 1977, p. 611)
I l l ic h 's  (1980) de fin ition  of power negotiating is quite sim ilar:
power is "the a b il ity  of the negotiator to motivate an opponent in a
manner that is favorable to the negotiator's negotiating objectives"
(p. 2 ). Cohen further explains that successful influence attempts
depend on tying one's goals to the needs and goals of one's opponent
in bargaining (I960 ).
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So the f i r s t  approach focuses on power as determined by the 
power user's needs and perceptions while the second approach focuses 
on the necessity of tapping into power target's'*) needs,- drives, and
A
motivations.
Level of aspiration theory (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960) is an 
example of the la t te r  perspective. I t  deals with the reaction of an 
influence target to the concession-making behavior of the influence . 
source. This theory is based on the assumption that small con­
cessions, made only a fte r a concession by one's oppoent, w ill cause 
the other to lower his or her aspirations. N aturally, th is would be 
advantageous to the tough bargainer. Thus, small, reciprocal 
concessions serve as a restraining force on one's bargaining opponent. 
Therefore, they are a manifestation of power.
S im ilarly , a great deal of research has been done on the 
effec t of threats on bargaining behavior (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960,
1962, 1966; Hornstein, 1965; Tedeschi, Linkskold, Horai & Gahagan, 
1969; Tedeschi, 1969; Gahagan & Tedeschi, 1969; Tsjovold, 1973; and 
Tedeschi, 1976). These studies assume that the use of threat can 
serve as both a driving force and as a restraining force on one's 
opponent. Threats may compel a target to comply with a demand or 
they may deter her or him from performing an undesirable act 
(Schelling, 1966). The lite ra tu re  on threats and th e ir  effects  
makes a d istinction between two types of power.
I f  A's power is such that he has available the 
p o te n tia lfo r  delivering a number of d iffe ren t 
outcomes to B, fa ir ly  evenly spread across the 
range which defines amount of power, A may be said 
to have precise power. I f  A has few responses, e.g. 
he can either deliver his most severe punishment or
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not punish at a l l ,  he may be said to have imprecise 
power. (Smith & Leginski, 1970, p. 60)
This view of power is very much lik e  the defin ition  offered by both
fie ld  theory and social exchange theory in that the power manifested
in threats is related to one's a b il ity  to punish the other.
These two broad approaches to the psychological deter­
minants of power are integrated by Minton (1972) in his discussion 
of power and personality. He states that power is ,  "a product of 
both one's immediate environmental structure and one's past 
experiences in attempts to carry out intended effects" (p. 129).
The immediate environmental structure is a function of the driving  
and restraining forces at work in any given s ituation . Past 
experiences w ill influence the arousal of need states as well as 
the perception of a b il ity  to carry out one's w ill successfully.
Both perspectives call fo r a sim ilar conceptualization of power with 
two s ign ifican t exceptions.
Power, in the view of the psychological theories is prim arily  
a function of actor's perceptions. An actor perceives a need, the 
existence of su ffic ien t resources to f u l f i l l  that need, the a b il ity  
of others to punish, and the likelihood of successfully achieving 
his or her goals. In addition, potential plays an important part in 
determining power from a psychological perspective.. Kipnis argues 
that power resu lts , in part, from su ffic ien t potential to influence 
(1976); I l l ic h  refers to the a b ility  to motivate an opponent (1980); 
Hornstein argues that the deterrent function of threats is served i f  
the target perceives the source as having su ffic ien t threat potential 
(1965); and Smith and Leginski equate both precise and imprecise
power with the potential for influencing the other's outcomes. 
F in a lly , behavior also plays a small role in power determination. 
Theorists and researchers have indicated that power dynamics and 
power perceptions can be effected by certain behaviors, most notably 
concession-making patterns (Siegel & Fouraker, 1970) and threats 
(Deutsch & Krauss, 1960, 1962; and others). In fa c t, Kipnis goes 
so fa r as to claim that power must be manifested in action (1976).
.Since psychological, theories deal with personal psycho­
logical processes, there is some disagreement about the direction  
and locus of power as viewed from th is theoretical perspective.
This confusion, however, stems from the lim ited scope of the theory 
which gives rise to the problem. The f i r s t  perspective argues that 
power stems from one's aroused needs and perceived a b il ity  to 
influence others. This implies that power is both unidirectional 
and zero-sum. That is ,  power is exercised by an individual with an 
aroused need and not by the person(s) he or she might be influencing 
Furthermore, to the extent that the influence source has resources 
to carry out her or his attempts, the target(s ) have no recourse. 
Thus, as the source's resources increase, the target's  power 
decreases. The major weakness o f.th is  analysis is that i t  ignores 
the needs and resources of the target. I f ,  in fa c t, the target has 
needs and resources, ju st as the source does, then power must be 
both m ultidirectional and shareable.
The second perspective, which focuses on the target of 
driving and restraining forces, suffers from the same weakness.
I t  implies that these forces flow from the source to the target and 
thus power is unidirectional. However, this approach fa ils  to
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recognize that when two parties in te rac t, each is a source and a 
ta rget, each compels and restrains the other simultaneously.
Therefore, power is m ultidirectional and shareable in that i t  is 
attempted and exercised by a ll parties in a relationship.
As the preceding discussion suggests, power is also an 
available resource as opposed to a possession of one party or 
another. Needs, psychological forces, threats, and concessions 
are not possessions of a given individual. Rather, they are 
psychological states or actions which any individual might expe­
rience, draw upon, or u t i l iz e  at any given moment. As with social 
exchange theory, even the resources one controls change in amount 
and type as time goes by, thus they too, are. merely available to 
the power user, not possessed by her or him.
F ina lly , i t  is clear that the psychological theories also 
view power as situation specific. D ifferent needs manifest themselves 
at d iffe ren t times (Maslow, 1962). Since each individual is  
psychologically unique, the need states, resources, and driving and 
restraining forces at work w il l  certa in ly  d if fe r  from one context 
to another as well as from one relationship to another. As Minton 
has. pointed out, power grows out of one's immediate experience as 
well as one's past experiences and both of these factors are always 
changing (1976).
In conclusion, i f  i t  is assumed that the psychological 
determinants of power influence a ll parties in an interaction in 
sim ilar ways, then power must be viewed as: 1) determined by
perceptions, po ten tia l, and the behavior of the parties,
40
2) m ultid irectiona l, 3) shared, at least in part, by a ll parties ,
4) available to the parties, not possessed by them, and 5) specific  
to the situation in which the parties find themselves.
Interaction Approach
A f i f t h  way of explaining human interaction is the interaction  
approach, otherwise known as the relational perspective. This 
approach is founded in the work of Bateson (in  Watzlawick, Beavin 
Jackson, 1967). The founding principles of th is approach are:
1. Every communicative act has a content aspect and a 
relationship aspect (Watzlawick, et a l . ,  1967).
2. In every communication exchange the interactants attempt 
to define or redefine th e ir relationship (Haley, 1959).
3. The most useful focus of communication analysis is the 
interaction behavior of the people rather than the individuals 
themselves.
This perspective assumes that the individuals' motivations, resources,
a b il i t ie s , needs, intentions, etc. are irre levan t. The only relevant
and useful data about a relationship is the pattern of interaction
behaviors. For instance, Turk says:
Group action can be explained only in terms of 
interactional patterns, thus we recognize that ' ^
individual goals are "unknowable" and-sometimes 
unknown even to the individual and that outcome is 
not the doing of a single individual or.party.
11974, p. 49)
Thus, i t  is the communication between the parties that defines the 
relationship between them. , .
Most importantly, Wilmot, et a l. (1981) state; , /
The relational approach to communication stresses 
to understand a relationship , one needs to focus on 
the control dimension--how the individuals exert 
power over one another, .(p. 61)
As early as 1959, Cartwright pointed out that "communication is the
mechanism by which interpersonal influence is exerted" (p. 7).
However, since a relationship is defined by both parties , a fourth
assumption becomes crucial to the understanding of power in human
relationships.
4. No power move can be said to re fle c t power on the part
of one party unless followed by a submissive move on the part of the
other party (Wilmot, 1978). In other words, "you do not have power-
i t  is given to you by others with whom you transact" (Wilmot, 1978,
p. 105).
Power, then, emerges out of the relationship. As a function 
of in teraction , power is equated with conversational control 
(Rogers & Farace, 1975 and Wilmot, et a l . ,  1981). This approach 
calls  for a view of power which is reflected in certain types of 
communication acts such as interruptions, commands, challenging 
questions, etc. A s lig h tly  d iffe ren t approach is taken by I l l ic h  
(1980) who claims that i t  is the negotiator's language which is the 
vehicle of negotiating power. He says,
In v ir tu a lly  every negotiation, . . . .  i t  is , 
in the fin a l analysis, your spoken and written words 
that w ill u ltim ately be the factor that determines 
whether or not you accomplish your negotiating 
objectives, (p. 91)
This claim is supported by Karrass (1974) who points out that power
is exerted each time a demand, concession, th reat, or promise is
made because the way in which these behaviors are performed alters
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the fin a l outcome by influencing the opponent's perceptions. The 
determinants of power then, are the behavior of the interactants in 
re lation  to the perceptions and responses evoked by those behaviors.
Power from the relational perspective is generally seen as 
a function of pairs of communicative acts or, a cue and its  response 
(Cushman & Craig, 1977). Each set of behaviors indicates the power 
relationship between the • interactants.. Systems theorists argue for 
the importance of perception in determining re la tive  power. In fa c t, 
they claim that the participants* behavior is simultaneously 
determined by and a determinant o f the parties' perceptions of 
re la tive  power (Haley, 1959; Watzfawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967; 
and Wilmot, 1979). Consequently > bargainers' perceptions (o f power 
and of th e ir relationship) are ju st as important as th e ir behavior 
according to the interaction approach.
Since power is a function of both parties ' communication i t  
must be m ultid irectional. By defin ition  both parties have equal 
input into the determination of re la tiv e  power. In addition, power 
is shareable in the relationship. Although two parties may define 
a relationship in which one is dominant and the other is submissive, 
the dominance may s h ift as the topic of conversation changes 
(Wilmot, 1979). Frost and Wilmot imply that the shareable nature 
of power is absolute when they propose that "one cannot not use 
power" (1978).
The interaction approach in general and the notion of 
re la tiv e  power in particu lar prohibit a conceptualization of power 
as a possession of any party. Events and interactions are
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transformed into a system of re la tive  power through the behavior of 
a ll parties involved in an interaction (Douglas, 1957). Power is 
not possessed by the parties but rather, ti t  is determined in the 
acting out of a co n flic t (Coser, 1967). In any case, power is a 
product of the in teraction --the relationship--not a possession of 
one or more actors.
I t  should be obvious from the preceding discussion that power 
is not a general capab ility  which carries over from relationship to 
relationship. I f ,  indeed, power emerges out of a relationship, and 
i f  every relationship is being constantly defined and redefined, then 
re la tive  power is established, reestablished or modified with each 
exchange between interactants. I t  changes from relationship to 
relationship, from topic to topic, perhaps even from moment to 
moment. Indeed an actor may give in to a power ta c tic  one minute 
and re jec t the use of that same ta c tic  a short time la te r .
In summary, the relational approach to human interaction  
requires a de fin ition  of power that 1) focuses on the parties 
behavior in re lation  to each other with some attention given to how 
that behavior might be perceived, 2) recognizes power as a function 
of a ll parties' in p u t-- it  is m u ltid irectiona l, 3) sees a ll parties  
as equally responsible for the re la tive  power in the re la tio n s h ip --it  
is shared, 4) recognizes i t  as an available resource, not a possession, 
and 5) sees i t  as determined d iffe re n tly  in each and every situation .
M a t  h em a t  i c a 1 /  P r o b a b i 1 i t  i e s 
Model
The mathematical/probabilities model assumes that any choice 
or move by one party w ill change or a-ffect possible choices of
response of the other (Watzlawick, 1976). Kahn and Boulding (1964) 
put i t  succinctly: "power is the a b il ity  of one person or group of
persons to. . . . change the p ro b ab ilities ,th a t others will.respond  
in certain ways to specified stimuli" (p. 4).
This model of the analysis of conflic t behavior is represented 
by two theoretical representations of human choice-making processes. 
F irs t , the game theoretical approach looks at behavior and choices 
as a function of payoff matrices. The most widely used matrix game 
is the Prisoner's Dilemma ,(Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) in which the 
parties' outcomes are determined by th e ir own choices in relation to 
the choice of the other. This game is a lim ited option game in 
which each player has only two choices. A sample matrix illu s tra te s  
the possible outcomes for the players (Figure 1).
Player B
bl b2
Player A
1
2
Figure 1
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Power, in this case, is the a b il ity  to influence the outcomes 
of the other player. For instance, in the above m atrix, i f  A chooses 
a^, i t  guarantees a positive payoff fo r B while a choice of a2 s 
insures a negative outcome fo r B. Therefore, while the positive and 
negative outcomes d if fe r  s lig h tly , A exerts considerable control over 
B's outcome, and, in th is case, B has equal control over A's outcomes.
Two types of control or power are iden tified  in the 
lite ra tu re : fate control and behavior control (Thibaut & Kelley,
1959). A player has fa te  control when her or his choice inevitably  
leads to a certain outcome for the other no matter what choice they 
make. The following matrix illu s tra te s  a matrix in which A has fate  
control over B (Figure 2 ).
This matrix also illu s tra te s  an instance in which B exerts 
behavior control over A. That is , B's choice leaves A with two 
d is tin c t a lternatives, one of which is c learly  more desirable than 
the other. B is said to have behavior control because he or she 
can, in e ffe c t, force A to choose â  by making a choice of b̂  since 
A, seeing that B has chosen b̂  w ill certa in ly choose a +5 outcome 
to a -5 outcome.
Player A
a2
Player B
+10 +10
-10 -10
Figure 2
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I t  should be noted that there are two key weaknesses to th is approach 
when comparing i t  to actual co n flic t behavior. F irs t , i t  assumes 
that the payoff matrix is known to both parties, when in fa c t the 
parties rare ly  know what the consequences of a given choice or action 
w ill be. Second, i t  assumes that the parties have only two a lte r ­
natives from which to choose in generating co n flic t behavior. In 
re a lity , i t  is a rare occasion when any party to a co n flic t has only 
two options. In short, the mathematical model is overly sim plistic  
and i t  overestimates the base knowledge of thebparties (S te in fa tt & 
M ille r , 1974).
The second approach involves the probabilities that the
players will.make certain choices. This approach is based on the*■
notion of subjective expected u t i l i t ie s  (SEU) (Walton & McKersie, 
1965).
Inasmuch as there are both potential positive and 
potential negative consequences associated with a given 
demand, the SEU of an alternate demand (x) is its  u t i l i t y  
(U) times the probability (P) that is w ill be acceptable 
plus the strike  costs (s) associated with a ,fa ilu re  to 
agree times the probability (1-p) that the demand w ill 
not be acceptable.
SEU = P(x) • U(x) + [ l-P (x ) ]  - S(x) (p. 37)
Simply stated, when faced with a choice between a lternative  actions, 
an actor weighs the possible benefits and the probability of gaining 
them against the possible costs and the probability of incurring 
them. In this case the equation applies d irec tly  to the bargaining 
situation but other theorists deal with probab ilities in a broader 
sense (Harsanyi, 1962).
Power, from this point of view, is equal to the probability that 
B w ill comply with A's demands (Dahl, 1957). Gamson (1968) defines
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power as a subjective probability determined by the likelihood that 
B would have complied without A's e ffo rts  to bring about B's choice. 
These two defin itions of power are both important but incomplete. 
Cavanaugh, et a l. (1980) combine the two in saying that power is the 
difference between the probability that B would have chosen a 
particu lar a lternative  without A's e ffo rts  and the probability that 
B w ill choose that a lternative with A's e ffo rts . I f  there is no 
difference between the probab ilities then no power has been exercised, 
even i f  B does exactly what A wanted in the f i r s t  place.
This approach is more re a lis tic  in that i t  does not lim it
the number of alternatives fo r the parties. Neither does i t  assume
A  *
that there are a fixed number of outcomes known to the parties. The 
major weakness of the subjective probability'approach, however, is 
that the cognitive processes of the actors are not quantifiable  
(Chertkoff & Esser, 1965). Consequently, there are no re lia b le  or 
valid measures of the amount of power in any given situation.
The mathematical probabilities approach offers no resolution 
to the question of whether power is based on behavior, perception, 
or potentia l. I f  power is measured by the a b il ity  to manipulate an 
opponent's outcomes based on a set payoff m atrix, then i t  must be 
defined as a potential of the actors. The notion of fate and 
behavior control, however, requires that power be defined as a 
function of the actors' choices, th e ir moves or behavior. I f ,  on 
the other hand, subjective u t i l i t ie s  and probabilities are the 
defining factors of power, then i t  is by defin ition  a function of
the actors' perceptions. In other words, i t  is not the behavior
/
which defines power but the perception of the behavior and the
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perceived likelihood that the behavior w ill have the desired e ffec t.
In addition, power is m ultid irectional. The payoff matrix 
approach assumes that both parties ' choices determine the fin a l 
outcome (Watzlawick, 1976). Although i t  is possible to construct a 
matrix in which one party's outcomes are fixed regardless of the 
other's choices, such matrices are unlikely to occur in natural 
settings. The subjective probabilities approach views power 
s im ila rly , in that one party's choices influence the perceptions of 
the other party and vice versa. Thus, a ll  parties exert some 
influence over the fin a l outcome.
Power is also seen as shareable. Each party is dependent,
to some extent, on the other to determine the outcome (Watzlawick,
1976). A's behavior a lters  B's options; B's subsequent choice alters
A's options; A's next choice, in turn, a lters  B's options fu rther,
* m
and so on un til an agreement is reached. Every choice by every 
party has some e ffec t on the subjective probabilities of gaining 
any given desired outcome.
Like most other theories, the mathematical/probabilities 
model treats power as an available resource and not as a possession 
of the parties. Even in a matrix game where certain fixed payoffs 
are known to the players, influence over the outcomes is something 
one uses, not something one has. In the case of subjective proba­
b i l i t ie s ,  one a lters  the probabilities through strategic choices 
available to her or him. Power is established in the acting out of 
the c o n flic t, i t  is not a possession brought into the situation by 
one or more parties.
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In lig h t of the analysis above, i t  is clear that power is 
situation specific. In each d ifferen t relationship the theoretical 
payoff matrix is d iffe ren t so, the re la tive  power is d iffe ren t.
Indeed, the payoff matrix may change as the parties move from topic 
to topic. In addition, the parties' perceptions of probab ilities and 
outcome values w ill change-somewhat with each interaction. Therefore, 
power is determined d iffe re n tly  in each situation and does not carry 
over from one context to another.
Power then, as seen from the perspective of the mathematical/ 
probabilities approach is : 1) a function of actors' po ten tia l,
which influences th e ir  behavior, which a lters  th e ir perceptions;
2) exerted by a ll  parties in a co n flic t; 3) shared by the parties 
as a result of th e ir  interdependence; 4) available to the parties as 
opposed to being a possession of one or more parties; and 5) specific  
to each situation or context.
These various theoretical approaches to power agree in some 
respects and disagree in others regarding th e ir  d iffe re n t concep­
tualizations of power. A ll the theories agree that power is 
m ultid irectional. I t  is axiomatic, then, that power is exerted by 
a ll  parties in a relationship. This is reflected in the notion that 
the parties are interdependent (Watzlawick, 1976), that they cannot 
not use power (Frost & Wilmot, 1978), and that power grows out of 
the relation between the parties (Rogers & Farace, 1975). In 
addition, there is no disagreement about the situation specific  
nature of power. One may use the same resources, tac tic s , 
punishments, etc. in d iffe ren t situations but they w ill always be 
perceived d iffe re n tly  and with d iffe ren t effects on the relationship.
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Three conceptual issues, however, remain unresolved. There 
is some agreement among the various theories on the question of 
whether power is a function of actors' po ten tia l, th e ir  behavior, or 
th e ir  perceptions. A ll the theories agree that power is determined 
through a combination of these determinants. In fa c t, the remaining 
two unresolved issues are only unresolved because certain theories 
view power as: 1) both shareable and zero-sum and 2) both a
possession and an available resource. In order to bring some closure 
to the theoretical and conceptual issues involved in the defin ition  
of power, the following explanations are offered to account for this  
p a rtia lly  unresolved state of a ffa irs .
A fundamental assumption of this paper is  that power is 
multidimensional. Each of the theories examined here has some 
v a lid ity  although they a ll  approach power from a d iffe ren t perspective. 
I t  would be a grave conceptual error to assume that power is purely 
a function of actors' po ten tia l, th e ir perceptions, or th e ir behavior 
alone. While one or more parties may have a potential source of 
power, that potential may be irre levant i f  i t  is not made clear to 
the other party through behavior. This notion follows Frost &
Wilmot's assumption that power is not something one has, but rather, 
i t  is given by the other parties in a relationship (1978).
For example, i f  A has a great deal of expertise but B does 
not acknowledge i t  or perceive i t  as relevant to the issue at hand, 
then B is unlikely to be influenced by the potential alone. In 
such a case, A must demonstrate his or her expertise to B's 
satisfaction through some form of behavior designed to a lte r  B's 
perceptions. Karrass (1974) and I l l ic h  (1980) argue convincingly
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that each action taken by the parties in a negotiation w ill a lte r  the
other's perception of the balance of power. I t  is evident that power
is not a function of any one dimension. I t  is a resu lt of the
interaction between potential sources, behavioral manifestations,
and the resulting altered perceptions of a ll  the parties involved.
Consequently, any study purporting to measure power must identify
and account for the actors' potential power, th e ir  perceptions of
power, and the acting out of th e ir  power relationship. U ntil the
interaction between these variables is more c learly  understood,
that interaction must be studied descriptively so that a grounded
theory of power dynamics might emerge from the otherwise confused
and contradictory findings of power research.
The question of whether power is shareable or zero-sum
remains unanswered, in part because of the nature of co n flic t.
Frost & Wilmot define co n flic t as
an expressed struggle between at least two 
interdependent parties, who perceive incompatible 
goals, scarce rewards, and interference from the 
other party in achieving th e ir goals. They are in 
a position of opposition in conjunction with 
cooperatioru (1978, p. 9, emphasis mine) ’ ■
To the extent that the parties oppose each other, they w ill attempt
to increase th e ir  power a t the other's expense. To the extent that
they cooperate they w ill be w illin g  and able to share power.
Bargaining in particu lar is generally viewed as a mixed-motive
f  . v '
situation . Walton and McKersie argue that bargaining may be 
d is trib u tive  (competitive/constant sum), or in tegrative (cooperative/ 
non-zero-sum) (1965). Consequently, in some respects, one party's  
increase in power requires a decrease in the other's power. But,
as Gamson (1968) suggests, two groups can simultaneously gain 
resources (power). Thus, when resources are d istributed , power is 
zero-sum. However, when dealing cooperatively with in tegrative  
issues, power is shared.
F in a lly , there is the question of whether power is possessed 
by one or more parties or is simply available to the parties. This 
point o f disagreement stems from the fact that power is m ulti­
dimensional. The sources of power associated with a party's  
potential (resources, existing coalitions, cost imposing a b il it ie s ,  
etc .) can be seen as possessions of one or more parties. On the 
other hand, i t  is also assumed that each party has available tactics  
or behaviors that can a lte r  the other's behavior or perceptions and 
consequently, the power relationship its e lf .
Power-then, is in part a possession of the parties but one 
which is subject to change through the e ffective  use o f available  
resources, strategies, and tactics . I t  is determined by the 
interaction of the potentia ls, perceptions, and behaviors of the 
parties and may be shared or fixed in overall quantity. In addition 
i t  is always exercised by a ll parties in some way and can only be 
determined according to the specific situation in which the parties 
find themselves.
Operational Definitions and Methodological Issues
Having explored the various theoretical orientations toward 
power and derived a comprehensive defin ition  of the concept and its  
determinants, the next task is to examine the various operational 
defin itions employed by researchers in the study of power. Although
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power related research has attempted to operationalize power in a 
number of d iffe ren t ways, these varied approaches can be broken down 
into four d is tin c t categories: 1) power as a function of outcomes,
2) power as a function of parties'; potentia ls, 3) power as a function 
of perceptions, and 4) power as determined by the parties ' behavior.
Power as Outcome
Power as a function of outcome has been operationalized 
through the use of game simulations. Most games have u tiliz e d  the 
payoff matrix as an index of outcome. D isparities between high and 
low power positions are simulated through the use of assymetrical 
payoff matrices in a prisoner's dilemma game (Deutsch, 1958;
Solomon, 1960; Deutsch & Krauss, 1962; Grant & Sermat, 1969; Tedeschi, 
et a l . , 1969; Tedeschi* 1969; and Gahagan & Tedeschi, 1969). These 
studies u tilize d  payoff matrices heavily weighted to favor one party 
in order to empower that player. Power was represented by the 
po ssib ility  of greater payoffs as exemplified in the following matrix. 
(Figure 3 ).
Strong 
A B
100 200A
-200100
B
110
Figure 3
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In th is situation the Strong player has behavior control because in 
picking A she or he can expect the Weak player to maximize his or 
her costs.
Pollard (1974) used a sim ilar scheme in comparing cooper­
ativeness of high power, equal power, and low power players. The 
high and low power conditions were created by use of a matrix sim ilar 
to the one above. The equal power position was created by use of a 
matrix where the payoffs were equal for both players. Thus, power 
is operationalized in the extant lite ra tu re  by giving one person 
control over another's outcomes.
Family power lite ra tu re  offers at least two additional 
approaches to the notion of power as outcome. F irs t , fam ilies are 
given decision-making tasks and power is  attributed to members who 
in i t ia l ly  held opinions or offered solutions which were reflected  
in the fin a l decision (Turk & B e ll, 1972; Olson & Rabunsky, 1972; 
Hadley & Jacob, 1973; and Klopper, T i t t le r ,  Friedman, & Hughes,
1978). Second, some measures are based on points awarded to players 
in a game simulation (Turk & B e ll, 1972 and Hadley & Jacob, 1973).
Power as outcome then, has been studied prim arily through 
the use of a r t i f ic ia l  game situations. Only a few studies have used 
actual decision-making tasks to assess outcome. The major weakness 
of the use of decision-making tasks is that the researchers have 
assumed that i f  a member holds a particu lar opinion or is the f i r s t  
to suggest a solution which is la te r  accepted by the group as a 
whole, that member has power. This does not take into account the 
fact that several, or maybe even a ll members, may have been 
predisposed toward that opinion or solution. Or perhaps another,
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more powerful member len t support to a position which was o rig in a lly  
suggested by a re la tiv e ly  low power group member.
The use of assymetrical matrices in a PD game to simulate 
power equates power with an a r t i f ic ia l  situation in which i t  is  
assumed that the players are fu lly  aware of the payoffs and 
consequently, have a clear and-accurate understanding of th e ir  
re la tiv e  power throughout the game. This assumption is  obviously 
unrealis tic  and casts serious-doubts on the v a lid ity  of such an 
approach to the measurement of power.
Power as Potential
The most common approach to the operationalization of power 
as a potential of the parties is the equation of power with threat 
poten tia l. The most common vehicle for this approach is Deutsch & 
Krauss' trucking game (1962). In the game, players have the a b ility  
to prevent th e ir opponent from using a shared trucking route by 
closing an access gate. Players' threat potential stems from th e ir  
a b il ity  to inform the other that they intend to close the gate. When 
only one player has the a b il i ty  to use a gate she or he is in a high 
power position. This condition is equated with "greater control of 
in i t ia l  resources" (Apfelbaum, 1974). Several researchers have used 
th is  game to test the behavior o f high and low power individuals 
in co n flic t (Deutsch & Krauss, I960; Hornstein, 1965; and Horai & 
Tedeschi, 1969). The control of a d iffe ren t kind of resource--money-- 
was used in an experiment by Greenberg (1978) to test the effects  
of re ta lia tiv e  power (the e ffec t of the knowledge that each player
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would control resource d istribution  on alternate t r ia ls  of a
distribution game).
Shorner, Davis, and Kelley (1966) modified,the. basic trucking
game to include an a lternative  route which players could use instead
of the main trucking route. The existence, of an a lternative  route
fo r one player presumably decreases the power of the other (Thibaut &
• •
Kelley, 1959). The addition of a ttra c tive  alternative relationships  
was also introduced as a variation to the-PD game by Thibaut &
Gruder (1969) to manipulate the trad itional power relationship in 
that context. ... •
A fin a l approach to power as potential is reported by Berger 
(1980) in his review of family power research. He reports on a 
number of studies done in several d iffe ren t countries variously 
equating conjugal power w ith rl) income lev e l, 2) educational le v e l, 
and 3) occupational.status. Although cross cultural comparisons 
yielded mixed resu lts , the studies generally concluded that husbands 
with higher status, in re lation  to th e ir  wives, had greater power.
Potentia l, as a determinant of power, has been equated with 
control over in i t ia l  resources, a b ility  to impose punishments or 
block goal achievement, and presence o f a lternative sources of 
outcomes. The trucking game suffers from one of the same basic 
weaknesses encountered in the PD game. That is , i t  is an a r t i f ic ia l  
situation with only one channel of communication and only two choices 
available to the players (cooperate of compete). In th is  respect i t  
is u n rea lis tic . The a v a ila b ility  of a lternative outcome sources 
adds an extra choice but i t  has only been offered within the confines 
of a lim ited game situation . The use of re la tiv e  income, education,
57
and occupational status is more re a lis tic  but i t  is much easier to 
compare these variables for husbands and wives than i t  is to compare 
bargaining teams on these same variables. I t  does suggest that 
management bargains from a position of re la tive  power since the 
workers are generally paid less, less educated,, and, by d e fin itio n , 
of lower occupational status than the marigement.
Power as Perception - .
The notion of perceived power has received'much attention in 
the lite ra tu re . The pioneer work in family power re lied  heavily on 
s e lf reports and that trad ition  has been carried, on, throug the years 
(Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Center, Raven, & Rodrigues; 1971; Olson & 
Rabunsky, 1972; and Turk & B e ll, 1972). These s e lf reports were 
prim arily concerned with who has the greatest influence over, 
decisions. The original study asked only wives to respond and dealt 
with general decision areas (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). Centers, e t a l. 
(1971) expanded the general decision areas to include more decisions 
typ ica lly  made by wives. The Olson & Rabunsky (1972) study used 
both husbands and wives as respondents and asked them to predict the 
amount of expected influence in a specific decision making task. 
F in a lly , Turk & Bell (1972) asked children to respond as well as the* 
parents and, in addition to the general decision areas used by Blood 
and Wolfe (1960), they asked two broad-based questions: Who wins 
disagreements? and Who is the boss?
Although each of these studies is an improvement on those 
which came before, they a ll suffer from the same major weaknesses. 
F irs t , the s e lf reports do not correlate with interaction measures
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(Olson, 1969; Olson & Rabunsky, 1972; and Turk & B e ll, 1972).
Second, while they do o ffe r at least one measure of who has power 
(however unreliable i t  may be) they o ffe r no explanation of the 
determinants of power.
A sim ilar use of s e lf reports is evidenced in a study by 
Paxton (1974). This study asked student, s ta ff ,  and parents at a 
federal school which group was the most in flu e n tia l. The responses 
of the various groups showed no correlation between the groups 
opinions. In fa c t, the study found that each group rated themselves 
as the least in flu e n tia l.
One early study did use a ’measure of. perceived power which 
correlated with a supplementary behavioral measure (L ip p itt ,
Polansky, and Rosen, 1952). Groups of boys at a'summer camp were 
asked to respond to the question "Who can get others to do what he 
wants?" The researchers then observed the boys' a c tiv it ie s  to 
determine which ones actually got the others to do what they wanted. 
L ip p itt , et a l. (1952) found a s ign ifican t correlation between 
attributed power and manifest power and found that the boys were 
highly accurate in ranking themselves within a power hierarchy at 
the same level that the other group members ranked them. In addition, 
the high power member-s behavior was seen by observers as consisting 
of more frequent and more d irec tive  influence attempts resulting in 
more successful influence.
The fa ilu re  of the more recent studies to rep licate the 
positive correlations found in the L ip p itt , et a l . (1952) study may 
be due to two sign ifican t differences between th is and the other 
studies. F irs t , th is study, unlike the others used same-sex peers,
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who, in a ll probability had sim ilar defin itions of power. The 
s im ila rity  in th e ir  power defin itions may have been due to the clear 
operational defin ition  offered in the question they were asked. A 
second, less obvious, d istinction is that young boys may be more 
d irect in th e ir  power attempts because they have not been socialized  
to disguise th e ir  power attempts. Recent studies suggest that 
subtle, nonverbal, camouflaged power techniques may be preferable 
because they w ill meet with less resistance and because overt control 
attempts lead to negative evaluations of the controlling individual 
(Salifion-Rothschild, 1970 and Bochner, Kaminski, & F itzpatrick ,
1977). While there is no empirical evidence to support the claim 
that children are not subject to the same.restrictions as those 
suggested in these other a r tic le s , i t  seems possible that these boys 
were more open about th e ir  influence attempts and were, therefore, 
more accurate in th e ir  perceptions of the power hierarchy in the 
groups.
A fin a l approach to the determination of power through s e lf  
reports is reflected in the research on compliance-gaining techniques 
(Marwell & Schmitt, 1967 and M ille r , Boster, Roloff, & Siebold,
1977), influence tactics (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980), 
arid power tactics (Cavanaugh, et a l . ,  1980). These researchers used 
essays and questionnaires to discover acceptable and commonly used 
power and influence behaviors. This approach seems to be the most 
applicable, especially in the bargaining setting because 1) the 
respondents were from an organizational/business setting and 2) the 
power tactics id en tified  by the respondents constitute actor-imposed 
determinants of power (as opposed to the researcher imposed
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determinants of the other studies). Thus, these studies are concerned 
with determinants of power and the power tactics are probably more 
valid in that they are derived from the responses of the subjects 
rather than the speculations of the researchers. This is consistent 
with the theoretical assumption that power is a function of actors' 
perceptions (Spector, 1977; Karrass, 1974; and I l l ic h ,  1980).
Power as Behavior
This method of operationalizing power attempts to equate 
certain behaviors and behavior types with power. Behavioral 
indicators of power fa l l  into categories in the research: ^ in t e r ­
action variables which lend themselves to quantification and 
2) behavior types which require q u a lita tive  judgments on the part 
of the researcher.
Four interaction variables are commonly used as power 
indicators in the lite ra tu re . Talk time is considered to be an 
indicator of power in that time is considered a scarce resource 
(Mischler & Waxier, 1968). Thus, the individual who talks most can 
be seen as exercising control over a scarce resource. Many 
researchers have measured power according to re la tive  ta lk  time 
(Mischler & Waxier, 1968; Hadley & Jacob, 1973; Klopper, e t a l . ,
1978; and Wilmot, e t a l . ,  1981). Mischler and Waxier (1968) do 
caution, however, that a powerful person may, in  fa c t, require very 
l i t t l e  ta lk  time to exert control over a group.
Another power indicator is the amount of ta lk  or the number 
of contributions offered by a person. This variable may be used more 
for its  ease of quantification than fo r any other reason since i t
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cannot be an absolute indicator of power any more than ta lk  time is . 
Consequently, researchers who have used this as an indicator of 
power ihave always used i t  in conjunction with other measures 
(Golembiewski, 1962; Mischler & Waxier, 1968; Turk & B e ll, 1972; and 
Wilmot, e t a l . ,  1981). A related variable which has also been used 
to supplement other measures of power is amount of communication 
received (Mischler & Waxier, 1968 and Klopper, et a l . ,  1978).
The fourth interaction variab le , and the most widely used 
indicator of power, is interruptions or ta lk-overs. Researchers 
assume that interruptions are a clear attempt to establish power in 
a relationship. Consequently, the number of interruptions and ta lk -  
overs have been used in several studies and in at least two coding 
schemes designed to determine re la tiv e  power (Mischler & Waxier,
1968; Turk & B ell, 1972; Hadley & Jacob, 1973; Rogers & Farace, 1975; 
and Donohue, 1978).
The second category of communicative determinants of power is 
not as easily quantifiable. This category requires researchers to 
code certain types of behavior based on the assumption .that they 
re fle c t or lead to greater power on the part;o f the user. One of the 
f i r s t  attempts to develop a taxonomy of power related behaviors 
appears in the work of Bales (1950), • He suggests that interactants  
exert instrumental control over a task through the expression of 
questions and answers, opinions, and ^suggestions. The control aspect 
of communication was most strongly connected to the act of suggesting 
although i t  is clear that i f  a suggestion is not followed up by the 
other person(s) in a relationship , i t  would have to be considered an 
unsuccessful control attempt.
More recent studies have examined threats and promises as 
indicators of power. Using social exchange theory as a theoretical 
base, researchers have argued that promises tend to decrease others' 
costs. Tedeschi (1976) reviewed over 80 studies exploring the 
effects of threats and promises and concluded that these types of 
behavior do indeed a lte r  the power relationship between two or more 
parties. Most bargaining lite ra tu re  includes some discussion of the 
effec t of threats and promises and these behaviors are standard 
categories in negotiation coding schemes (Anglemar & Stern, 1978 and 
Donohue, 1978).
Several additional q u a lita tive  types of behavior are 
discussed in the work of Rogers and Farace (1975) and Donohue (1978) 
Both studies developed coding schemes based on the assumption that 
relationships (and power within those relationships), are defined by 
the interaction between the parties rather than the e ffo rts  of any 
single interactant. The former coding procedure is designed for use 
in interpersonal exchanges and measures conversational control. The 
la t te r  is  designed for bargaining contexts and measures re la tive  
advantage (bargaining power). These two coding schemes are of 
particu lar in terest because they focus on power in relationships.
Code categories representing message forms and 
response modes that are viewed as control maneuvers 
toward one-up are: nonsupport responses, including
questions demanding an answer, answers with substance, 
instructions, orders, disconfirmations, topic changes, 
complete statements of in it ia t io n , and talkovers except 
supportive talkovers and those with unclassifiable  
response modes. (Rogers & Farace, 1975, p. 232)
Mischler & Waxier (1968) and Bales (1950) have already 
equated questions with power and talkovers have also been previously
iden tified  as indicators of power. However, the Rogers and Farace 
scheme (1975) adds seven more behavior types to the l is t  of 
"powerful" behaviors: 1) nonsupport, 2) answers, 3) instructions,
4) orders, 5) disconfirmation, 6) topic changes, and 7) in itia tio n s . 
These behaviors a ll re flect: power attempts and cannot be equated with 
power unless the other person(s) respond with a one-down or one-across 
(submissive or neutral) message.
Dononue's coding scheme (1978) id en tifies  seven powerful 
behaviors at two levels of in tensity . High in tensity power attempts 
include: 1) charging the other with fa u lt , 2) threats and promises,
and 3) topic changing. Low in tensity power moves include:
1) in it ia t io n , 2) nonsupportive talkovers, 3) charging and denying 
a charge, and 4) making an o ffe r. With the exception of threats and 
promises, these behaviors correspond closely to those suggested by 
Rogers and Farace (1975). Donohue (1978) had discarded the question, 
instruction, and order categories on the grounds that these behaviors 
did not appear in his p ilo t study.
I t  is interesting to note that the coding schemes fa i l  to 
u t i l iz e  any interaction variables other than talkovers. In lig h t of 
the findings of Folger and S illa rs  (1977) who discovered that naive 
observers saw both ta lk  time and interruptions as fa r more dominant 
than the behavior types used in the coding scheme they tested. Thus 
i t  would seem to be a serious methodological e rro r to re ly  on 'coding• 
schemes alone as an indicator of re lational power. Two additional 
issues raised by the Folger and S illa rs  (1‘977) study further question 
the r e l ia b i l i t y  of coding schemes as measures of power.
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F irs t , i t  appears that certain behavior types are inconsistent 
as indicators of power. That is , sometimes the observers rated a 
particu lar behavior type as powerful while at other times they saw 
a behavior of the same type as m ildly dominant or even neutral. 
Furthermore, observers reported that tone of voice, posture, and 
fac ia l expression also influenced th e ir perceptions of who was 
dominant in a given situation but existing coding schemes do not 
account for nonverbal indicators of power. Safilios-Rothschild (1970) 
supports the consideration o f nonverbal influence tactics in pointing 
out that submissive persons use more nonverbal influence techniques 
in order to avoid rebuffs and resistance from the more dominant 
relational partner.
Two problems plague power researchers when they attempt to 
use coding schemes as an indicator of power. F irs t , no coding scheme 
focuses on power dynamics as the primary variable of in terest. Only 
one coding scheme has a specific method for identifying power and 
this system ignores the perceptions o f the actors (Donohue, 1978).
This serves to il lu s tra te  the second problem, which is lack of 
v a lid ity . Actually, existing coding schemes have not been shown to 
lack v a lid ity  but neither have they established i t .  Coding schemes 
are universally evaluated on in te rra te r r e l ia b i l i t y  but v a lid ity  
checks are conspicuous in th e ir absence from these studies.
Establishing the v a lid ity  of a coding scheme is a must, given the 
fact that every existing scheme is generated from theory rather than 
from participants' perceptions. Folger and S illa rs  (1977) and Poole 
and Folger (1981) have clearly  indicated that participants' 
perceptions are crucial in establishing the v a lid ity  and u t i l i t y  of
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interaction coding. This study w ill attempt to resolve these 
problems by generating a coding system based on the participants' 
perceptions of power related behavior.' The coding w ill be performed 
by trained coders in order to combine the "insider" and the "outsider'.' 
perspectives, both of which are crucial in illum inating the complex 
dynamics which lead to the determination of power in human re la ­
tionships (Olson, 1981).
In conclusion, outcome and potential measures are based on 
highly a r t i f ic ia l  game situations with lim ited communication between 
the parties. S elf reports of perceived power and predicted power 
consistently show an in a b ility  o f subjects to accurately predict who 
w ill win or who w ill exert the most influence. In fa c t, perceived 
power measures show a marked difference in the perceptions of the 
d iffe ren t group members.
Some speculative reasons for the high correlation found in 
L ip p it t , et a l. (1952) study have already been offered. Positive 
correlations between perceived power, outcome measures, and process 
measures were also found in a more recent study by Klopper, et a l. 
(1978). The unique elements of this study may o ffe r important 
insight for future researchers. Unlike most outcome and potential 
studies of power, th is study used in ta c t, ongoing groups as opposed 
to strangers. In addition, the group task (determining goals for 
family change) was both relevant and "real" in the sense that i t  had 
ramifications for future behavior in the group.
The perceived prominence in the group was measured by 
analyzing the placement order and placement height-of figures
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(representing family members) on a f e l t  board. Wilmot (1980) 
suggests that re lational defin itions are ty p ica lly  more metaphorical 
and analogic than e x p lic it and l i t e r a l .  Thus, the perception measure 
used in the Klopper, et a l.  (1978) study may be much more suited to 
re fle c t re lational defin itions than the e x p lic it questions asked in 
other measures of perceived power. Furthermore, the family members, 
having framed the relationships in such a way, are more lik e ly  to 
re fle c t the relationship defin itions in th e ir  behaviors (Wilmot,
1980). Berger supports the use of metaphors in saying:
encoding the phenomenal experience of power through 
verbal language may be d i f f ic u lt .  Perhaps the use of 
figures and th e ir  re la tiv e  placements to index power 
provides a symbol system more iconic to the experience 
of power relationships in real l i f e .  Thus, these kinds 
of measures correlate better with noncontent aspects 
of communication behavior than do se lf-rep o rt measures 
relying heavily upon, verbal language. (1980, p. 208)
S im ilarly , Bochner (1978) argues for more analogic analysis of
communication phenomena. His argument is based on the assumption
that a ll  communication has both analogical and d ig ita l aspects
(Watzlawick, et a l . ,  1967) and to focus on only the d ig ita l aspects
"is an extraordinary oversim plification of the relational messages
exchanged in enduring relationships" (p. 183). He proposes an
analysis of the metaphors present in an interaction because they
represent the parties ' analogies about th e ir  relationship . While
there is no' tested or widely accepted method o f analyzing metephors
as indicators of relationship defin ition s , th is  study w ill attempt
to id en tify  the analogs present in the interaction of the subjects
as a way of further testing the u t i l i t y  of th is approach.
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In summary, power has been examined in terms of the
conceptual issues relevant to its  d e fin itio n , the various theoretical
perspectives on social interaction and th e ir  influence on the concept 
of power, and the methodological d iff ic u lt ie s  encountered in the 
study and measurement of power. Power remains a d i f f ic u lt  concept 
to define. I t  has been shown to be exercised by and available to a ll
parties in a relationship , at least to some degree. The addition of
the element of situation sp ec ific ity  marks power as a relational 
concept. Power is re la t iv e —i t  is determined, defined, and exercised 
d iffe re n tly  in each relationship. Relative power is constantly 
changing throughout an in teraction .
In addition, power is multidimensional in that i t  is 
determined by at least four d iffe ren t factors. I t  is determined, 
in part, before interaction occurs by situational factors (potentia l) 
as suggested by f ie ld  theory, social exchange theory, and coalition: 
theory. Power is also determined during an interaction as suggested 
by the interaction approach and the psychological theories. In this  
case the actor's behavior is the principle indicator o f re la tiv e  
power, although some consideration is given to the actors' perceptions 
of that behavior. The th ird  dimension sees power as being determined 
a fte r the interaction (outcome) as suggested by the outcome 
perspective of social exchange theory. This retrospective view of 
power equates i t  with who gets his or her way. The fourth dimension 
of power is perception. This dimension overrides and permeates a ll 
the other dimensions. I f  a party does not see the other as having 
power potentia l; i f  he or she does not perceive a particu lar behavior 
or behavior pattern as powerful; i f  she or he does not see the outcome
68
as favoring one party; then he or she w ill not grant the other party 
power. Consequently, this study w ill look at participants' 
perceptions of power before, during, and a fte r  a bargaining in te r­
action in an attempt to measure and account for these four dimensions 
of power.
This overriding emphasis on perceptions of power requires a 
suspension of reliance on theoretical defin itions of power since 
most people are unaware of what power theorists say about power. 
Participants' assessments of power may or may not correlate with 
theoretical determinants of power. That remains to be seen. Two of 
the theories previously discussed pose prohibitive measurement 
problems. For that reason they w ill not influence the analysis of 
the data in this study. Coalition theory does not specify the kind 
of resources gained when .two parties merge. In actual bargaining 
situations, each team already represents a coalition and i t  is 
unlikely that new coalitions w ill form during the bargaining in te r­
action. Consequently, no coalitions w ill be allowed in th is study,,
The mathematical/probabilities model measures power according to 
probability formulae which have no quantifiable elements. This model 
then, has l i t t l e  u t i l i t y  for power research. The other theories w ill 
be considered in analyzing the categories derived from the perceptions 
of the subjects to see i f  there is any s im ila rity  between what 
theorists see as the determinants and what participants see as the 
determinants of power.
Looking at the operational defin itions of power, i t  appears
■ v
that no single measure is adequate to fu lly  describe power in a
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relationship. The few studies that have found correlations between 
measures are promising in that they suggest that consistent 
correlations can be found i f  and when certain methodological problems 
are resolved. Correlations found in the Klopper, e t a l. (1978) 
study suggest that metophorical, analogic measures of perceived power 
may be more valid than descriptive, d ig ita l measures. Folger and 
Si lia rs ' (1977) findings also suggest that preconceived, theory-based 
coding schemes have questionable v a lid ity . As Wilmot, e t a l. (1981) 
point out, "the arb itra ry  selection of any index o f power is unlikely  
to accurately represent the operation of power in a given c o n flic t."
The r e l ia b i l i t y  of power, research is also questionable i f  
researchers continue to u t i l iz e  ad hoc groups in th e ir  studies.
Studies that were successful in finding correlations between measures 
used actual ongoing groups rather than unacquainted experimental 
subject. Future research/should attempt to .use representative groups 
and to engage them in relevant tasks with at least some semblance 
of future consequences fo r;the  relationship.
F in a lly , Berger (1980) may be righ t in suggesting that the 
general fa ilu re  to find correlations between d iffe ren t measures of 
power is due to the fact that they are measuring d iffe ren t dimensions 
of the construct. Indeed, power may be contextual in that d iffe ren t 
contexts (marriage, bargaining,, boys a t play, classrooms, work 
settings, e tc .) call fo r and re fle c t d iffe re n t dynamics of power 
emergence and d e fin itio n . However, this w ill remain an unanswered 
question un til future studies o f power, in any context, have overcome 
the problems of v a lid ity  and r e l ia b i l i t y  that have plagued power 
research in the past.
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Research Questions
In an attempt to c la r ify  the role of participants' 
perceptions, behaviors, and potential on the determination of power 
in the bargaining context this study w ill address the following 
research questions:
1. Do peoples' orientations toward power influence
a. the behaviors they see as powerful?
b. th e ir  choice of power tactics?
2. Do participants;assess power d iffe re n tly  before an 
imposed task than they do a fte r  task completion?
3. Do participants' perceptions of power correlate with 
observers' perceptions of power?
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY.
This chapter w ill b r ie fly  outline the research methods used 
to co llec t and analyze the data in this study. This discussion w ill 
include a description of: 1) the subjects, m aterials, and data
collection procedures, 2) the generation and use of the coding schemes 
constructed for this study, and 3) the procedures used to analyze the 
data.
Subjects
The subjects for this study were six bargainers recruited  
from local bargaining teams in the Missoula, Montana area. The 
subjects were divided into two experimental bargaining groups, one 
playing the role of the union team and the other playing the role of 
the management team. Each team was comprised of two men and one 
woman. In addition each team had two bargainers from the public 
sector and one member from the private sector. I t  was considered 
crucial to the generalizabi1ity  of the study that experienced 
bargainers be used, since most research on bargaining is done with 
inexperienced college students as subjects.
Materials
The study required twelve copies of the Power Orientation
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Scale (POS) and an accompanying decision-making questionnaire 
(Appendix 1 ). These scales were used as both the pre-test and the 
post-test for each subject. Two tape recorders and two 120 minute 
audiotapes were used to record the pre-simulation discussions for 
each team, the caucus during the simulation,Cand:'the “post-simulation 
interviews.
The recording and .administration of the bargaining simulation 
required: six copies of the "Corn Valley Lumber Bargaining Simu­
lation" (Appendix 3 ), three copies each of the Union's Confidential 
Instructions and the Company's Confidential Instructions, two black 
and white videotape recorders, cameras, and monitors, two microphones, 
and two hour long videotapes.
F in a lly , ten research assistants helped complete th is  study: 
two ran the cameras and conducted interviews during the bargaining 
simulation session, four carried out data sorts to generate and 
check the coding schemes, and four assisted by coding the videotapes. 
All of the research assistants were graduate or senior level students 
in the Department of Interpersonal Communication at the University 
of Montana.
Procedures
Upon arriva l at the research s ite  the subjects were asked to 
f i l l  out the POS pre-test as an indicator of th e ir  general orien­
tation toward decision-making, c o n flic t, and bargaining. When a ll 
of the subjects had completed this task they were each given a copy 
of the Corn Valley Simulation General Instructions as well as the 
confidential instructions for th e ir  particu lar team. (The subjects
were assigned to either the Union or the Company team according to 
the side they normally represent in th e ir  jobs as bargainers).
A fter they had a l l ; had a chance to look over the instructions the 
two teams were sent to separate rooms with the simulation scoring 
sheet and instructions to p r io r it iz e  th e ir options on each issue and 
to predict how each team would fare on each issue. This pre­
simulation strategy session was audiotaped and lasted for 
approximately fo rty -fiv e  minutes.
The subjects were then reunited in the main room where the 
bargaining session was to take place. The teams sat across from 
each other at a large square table. The,two cameras were situated  
above and behind each team such that each camera could record the 
movements, gestures, and fac ia l expressions of one of the teams for  
coding la te r . The principal researcher instructed the teams to 
speak fre e ly , not lim iting  themselves to one spokesperson per team 
and told them that there would be a s tr ic t  one hour time lim it  on
the bargaining session. The entire  simulation was recorded on tape
with the exception of a twenty minute caucus during which the 
videotape cameras were shut o f f  and the teams met and were audio­
taped in th e ir  separate conference rooms.
Upon completion of the bargaining simulation the teams were
again separated and were interviewed by two research assistants 
(see Appendix 2 for interview questions). The interviews were 
recorded on audiotape for use in the generation of one of the coding 
schemes. The subjects were asked to estimate to what degree each 
team "got its  way" on each issue and f in a lly  they returned to the
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main room to complete the POS post-test packet before being dismissed.
Four of the subjects'*' returned to the research s ite  six days 
la te r  to view and comment on the videotapes. The subjects were 
provided with a transcript of the bargaining /interaction and were 
asked to indicate by underlines or marginal notes, what behaviors - 
(e ith e r verbal or nonverbal) tended to "get the other team to move 
in. the desired d irection ." Following the viewing of both tapes the 
subjects engaged in a b rie f discussion of general bargaining tactics  
while the principal researcher took notes. F in a lly , the subjects 
were thanked fo r th e ir  help and cooperation-, the transcripts Were 
collected (with each subjects code number marked on them) and the 
subjects were dismissed.
Generation of the Coding Schemes
Two sets of coding categories were used in th is study, each 
generated from a d iffe ren t set of data. The f i r s t  coding scheme was 
generated from the subjects' responses to the post-simulation 
interview sessions. The principal researcher listened to each teams 
interview tapes, extracting a ll references to power or influence 
tactics and strategies. These strategies anditactics were recorded 
on notecards with the code number of the subject who made each 
suggestion on the back. The second coding scheme was generated from 
the notes the subjects made while watching the videotapes of the
T̂wo of the company team participants fa iled  to show up at 
the viewing session at the agreed upon time due to unexpected 
business commitments.
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simulation. Each underlined statement or marginal note was recorded 
on a notecard with the code number of the individual who saw that 
behavior as powerful recorded on the back.
Forty-one tactics or strategies were extracted from the 
interview data while fo rty^five power moves were indicated by the
subjects while watching themselves on tape. Each set of notecards
was kept separate throughout the following procedures. Both sets 
of tactics are lis ted  in Appendix 4.
Two research assistants were asked to sort both sets of 
cards into logical categories. They each separated both sets of 
cards into three categories. These two sets of categories for each 
set of cards were compared using a simple agreement matrix 
(Appendix 4 ). Using the best agreement of the two sorters, the
principal researcher expanded the categories to incorporate a ll the
cards into logical categories. This procedure resulted in the 
generation of four categories for the interview data and five
categories for the videotape data.
Two new assistants were given the categories produced by the 
researcher and asked to separate each set of cards into its
respective set of categories. This procedure allowed for a check
on the r e l ia b i l i ty  of the two sets of coding categories by subjecting 
the second set of card sorts to Cohen's. Index of Agreement (Cohen, 
1960). The coding schemes were then ready fo r use in analyzing 
the videotapes.
Coding the Data
The data to be coded were the two hour-long videotapes of the
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bargaining simulation. Two independent coders were trained in the 
use of each coding scheme by the principal researcher. The training  
consisted of providing each coder with a br ie f written description 
of the categories they would be using and reading several examples 
of the behavior associated with each category from the cards 
belonging to that category. All four coders viewed the videotapes 
simultaneously. The tape showing the Company team was,,played f i r s t  
and the Union team tape was played second. The coders were
instructed to code only the behaviors of the team appearing on
camera. They were provided with coding sheets on which to record
the number of behaviors exhibited by each subject in each category
(see Appendix 4 ) .  The unit of analysis for the.coders,.then, is the 
subject.
Analysis o f  the Data
The f i r s t  research question deals with the relationship 
between an individual's orientation toward power and 1) the 
behaviors he or she identifies as being powerful and 2) his or her 
choice of power tactics in bargaining. To examine this question 
each subject's score on the POS post-test was compared with 1) the 
tactics that individual suggested during the post-simulation 
interview and 2) the actual behavior that individual exhibited during 
the bargaining interaction (as coded by the observers).
F irs t ,  each subject's primary orientation toward power was 
determined by computing the POS post-test scores. Subjects with the 
same orientation toward power were expected to suggest and exhibit
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similar power related behaviors. Since the notecards belonging in 
each category of both coding schemes was marked with the code number 
of the subject who suggested i t ,  the number of suggestions made, by 
each subject in each category were recorded. Consequently, i t  was 
possible to identify  the number of behaviors suggested or seen as 
powerful by each subject in any given category. Given the small 
subject pool of this study, a qualitative judgment must be made as to 
whether any given subject suggested significantly  more behaviors in 
any category than any other subject.
Second, the coding of the data identified  the number of 
behaviors exhibited by each subject in each category. The number of 
behaviors for each subject in each category was determined according 
to coder agreement. For instance, i f  Coder A recorded twelve 
behaviors for a given subject in a given category and Coder B 
recorded fif teen  behaviors in that category, then the coders agreed 
that at least twelve behaviors were exhibited in that category. A 
qualitative judgment, then was made as to whether any given subject 
exhibited significantly  more behaviors in any category than the other 
subjects.
The second research question asks whether people assess 
power d iffe ren tly  prior to bargaining than they do a fter  a bargaining 
task. This question was analyzed in two ways. F irs t ,  each teams'
POS pre-test scores were compared to th e ir  post-test scores through 
the use of a correlated t - te s t .  Second, the scores of a ll  the 
subjects on each dimension of the POS were compared to th e ir  post­
test scores, again by using a correlated t - te s t .  In this way i t  was
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possible to discover whether there was any change in orientation  
within each team and whether there was any change overall in the 
subjects' orientations.
The final research question concerns the correlation between 
participants' perceptions of the power relationship between the 
parties and the nonparticipant observers' perceptions of the parties' 
re la tive  power. Three measures of overall power were used in this  
comparison. F irs t ,  the final outcome of the bargaining session was 
scored according to the scores provided by each team on the 
simulation scoring sheet. The scores for each issue's outcome were 
added to provide an overall outcome score for each team. Second, 
in the post-simulation interview session each subject was asked to 
indicate how the teams fared in relation to.each other on each issue. 
This was done by having each, subject s p l i t  up a pie chart for each 
issue to indicate which team came out ahead (see Appendix 2). The 
f ina l measure was made by adding the total number of powerful 
behaviors (as marked by the coders) for each team. By determining 
these totals i t  was possible to identify  which team each of the four 
coders saw as more powerful overall.
The scores derived from the simulation scoring sheet served 
as a base measure with which to compare the subjects' and observers 
subjective judgments of which team was the. most powerful. By using 
numerical values and proportionate measures on the pie charts i t  was 
possible to determine the extent to which one team was perceived as 
exerting more power. Again, the nature of these three gross measures 
of power requires that they be qu a lita tive ly  compared.
Chapter 4
RESULTS
The results of the study w ill be reported here in two main 
sections. F irs t ,  the r e l ia b i l i t y  measures for the card sort and 
coding procedures w ill be examined. Second, the results pertaining 
to the three main research questions w ill be reviewed.
Data Sorts and Coding R e lia b il i t ie s
Two separate coding schemes were generated and used to 
analyze the data in this study. The f i r s t  (CS1) was generated from 
the forty-one tactics suggested by the subjects in the post­
simulation interview session. The second (CS2) was derived from the 
fo r ty -f iv e  behaviors identified  (by the subjects) as power moves 
during the videotape viewing session. Two judges sorted both sets 
of cards separately. These two independent sorts of each set of 
data were compared in a simple agreement matrix. The original data 
for each coding scheme and the matrices of agreement for the 
independent data sorts can be found in Appendix 4.
The principal researcher constructed a set of four categories 
for CS1 and a set of five  categories for CS2 around the categories 
derived from the judges' independent sort of the data (Table 1).
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Table 1
List of Categories for CS1 and CS2
C$1 Category I . Increase the amount of information: keep the
discussion going, emphasize experience, 
understanding, and the existence of prior 
relationships between teams
Category I I .  Increase specific ity  of information: get clear
Category I I I .  Restrict the other team: be in flex ib le  and
uncooperative
Category IV. Throw the process o ff  balance: confuse, pressure,
and d istract the other team
CS2 Category I.
Category 11. 
Category I I I .
Category IV.
Category V.
Logic and reasoning: present your own or
challenge the other teams'
Dead ends: communicate in f le x ib i l i t y
Give and take: exchange offers , proposals, or
concessions
Power cues: nonverbal emphasis, response, or
disinterest
Pressure tactics: reject offers, insult, refer
to the lim its
Tables 2 and 3 outline the results of a second data sort in which two 
new judges were instructed to separate each set of cards into the 
categories provided by the researcher. An acceptable level of 
agreement for this procedure is .70.
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Table 2
M atrix  o f  Agreement fo r  the P ost-S im ulation 
In te rv ie w  Data S ort (by P ropo rtion )
Category 1
Judge A 
2 3 4 pB
1 . 26 (.11 )* .03 .00 .00 .29
2 .04 . 13(.03) .00 .00 .17
Judge B
3 .03 .00 .0 8 (.03) .03 .14
4 .05 .00 .11 .24(.11) .40
pA .38 .16 .19 .27 1.00
Parentheses in d ica te  the p ropo rtion  o f agreement 
th a t could be expected by chance
Agreement = .26 + .13 + .08 + .24 = .71
Table 3
M atrix  o f Agreement fo r  the Videotape 
Viewing Session Data 
(by P roportion)
Category 1
Judge A 
2 3 4 5 PB
1 . 19(.07 )* .02 .02 .00 .04 .27
2 .00 •1 1 (.03) .02 .00 .04 .17
Judge B 3 .00 .00 . 11(.02) .00 .02 .13
4 .00 .00 .00 .21(.04 ) .00 .21
5 .07 .02 .00 .00 .13 ,.22
pA .26 .15 .15 .21 .23 1 .00
•k
Proportion  o f agreement th a t could be expected to chance
Agreement = .19 + .11 + .11 + .21 + .13 = .75
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The results reported in Table 3 represent the second sort of 
the CS2 data. The f i r s t  sort yielded an unacceptably low level of 
agreement (.56) so the judges were asked to repeat the procedure 
approximately one week a fte r  the f i r s t  sort. The same judges were 
used and they were given the same instructions except that the 
researcher provided an oral defin ition of each category along with 
the wirtten definitions the judges had received for the f i r s t  sort.
Having achieved a higher level of agreement for the two 
coding schemes, a l l  that remained was to test the r e l ia b i l i t y  of 
coders using the categories. In coding the videotapes, two coders 
analyzed the bargaining interaction using the f i r s t  coding scheme 
(CS1) and two d ifferent coders used the second coding scheme (CS2). 
They recorded the number of behaviors exhibited by each subject in 
each category using the coding sheets provided by the researcher 
(see Appendix 4 ) . Tables 4 and 5 report the ratio  of agreement 
to disagreement per cell and the percent of agreement per category.
The ratios reported in the following tables indicate the number of  
behaviors both raters recorded in each cell as opposed to the number 
of behaviors one rater recorded that the other did not. For example, 
i f  Rater A recorded five  behaviors in a given cell but Rater B only 
recorded three, then they agreed that there were three behaviors 
but disagreed regarding the other two behaviors recorded by Rater A. 
Thus the table would report 3:2 for that c e l l .  The agreement figures 
were computed by dividing the total number of coded behaviors into 
the number of agreed upon behaviors.' A .70 level of coder agreement 
was considered minimally acceptable for the purposes of this study.
83
Table 4
In terra ter R e lia b il i ty  for CS1
Subjects U1 U2 U3 Cl C2 C3 Agreement
I . Amount of Info 8:1 4:0 6:4 5:1 4:4 12:0 .80
I I . Specific ity  of Info 3:4 5:7 3:1 1 :1 5:0 5:2 .61
I I I . Restrict the Other 1:3 4:12 2:7 1:4 7:0 4:3 .40
IV. Throw o f f  Balance 4:2 5:1 1:8 3:1 8:4 3:6 .56
Table 5
In terra ter R e lia b il i ty  for CS2
Subjects U1 U2 U3 Cl C2 C3 Agreement
I . Logic & Reason 5:3 12:7 9:3 2:5 5:6 9:5 .59
I I . Dead Ends 0:0 1 :1 0:2 0:2 1:4 2:3 .25
I I I . Give & Take 2:6 7:4 8:2 0:5 4:3 5:3 .53
IV. Power Cues 26:4 26:0 25:15 6:8 30:5 16:4 .78
V. Pressure Tactics 2:0 3:1 7:1 2:0 2:2 5:0 .84
Clearly, Category I (CSV) yielded an acceptable level of 
coder agreement while the other categories did not. For CS2, 
Categories IV and V yielded acceptable levels of agreement while the 
others did not. The training of the coders for CS1 consisted of an 
oral description and defin ition of each category and reading a l l  the 
cards in each category. The coder training for CS2 was orig ina lly  
identical to the CS1 coder train ing. However, the f i r s t  coding of
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the tapes did not y ie ld  acceptable agreement levels for any 
categories. Two new coders were recruited and were provided with a 
written description of each category, including a complete l i s t  of 
the items that had been sorted into the categories.. In add ition ,',  
they coded a ten minute segment of videotape as a practice and 
discussed discrepancies in the ir  ratings before coding the entire  
tapes. This ad d itiona l training had mixed results. The agreement 
for Categories I ,  IV, and V increased from .56, .47, and .35 to .59, 
.78, and .84, respectively. However, the agreement for categories I I  
and I I I  decreased from .48 and .57 to .25 and .53, respectively.
I t  is almost certain that the re la t ive  lack of re liab le  
coding using CS1 was due to the fact that the coders had no practice 
in the use of the coding scheme. The categories are so general in 
the ir  present form that some form of c la r if ic a tio n  is a must. To 
some extent coder bias may have also played a part in undermining 
the r e l ia b i l i t y  of CS1. Coder 2 coded forty more behaviors for the 
Union team than Coder 1 and he coded sixty more behaviors overall, 
contributing strongly to the overall disagreement between coders. 
Finally , some of the discrepancies in coding may be attributable  
to coder disinterest. Although the coders were allowed a fif teen  
minute break between the two, f i f t y  minute videotapes, they engaged 
in conversations about topics unrelated to the task during the coding 
of the second videotape (showing the Union team). These drawbacks 
might be overcome by: 1) more extensive training of coders,
including practice runs and 2) separating the coders, by using 
partit ions, during the coding sessions.
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The recording of the tapes using CS2 produced some interesting 
but enigmatic results. Categories IV and V, which had had the 
lowest r e l ia b i l i t ie s  (.47 and .35 respectively) had the highest 
r e l ia b i l i t ie s  a fter  the recording (.78 and ^ ^ re s p e c t iv e ly ) . During 
the practice session and subsequent discussion the second set of 
coders focused th e ir  comments on those two categories almost 
exclusively so i t  is not surprising that the r e l ia b i l i t y  was enhanced. 
For categories I (Logic and Reasoning) and I I I  (Give and Take) the 
r e l ia b i l i t y  remained v ir tu a lly  the same. I t  may have been d i f f ic u l t  
to distinguish between these two categories since exchanging 
concessions seems lik e  a logical thing to do. In any case, these 
categories are fa i r ly  general and need further c la r i f ic a t io n . The 
ten minute training session was probably insuffic ient to c la r i fy  the 
fine distinctions that needed to be made. 'F inally, the r e l ia b i l i t y  
of Category I I  (Dead Ends) dropped dramatically (from .48 to .25).
One reason for this may have been that this category contained the 
fewest coded behaviors. As a result* even a re la t ive ly  small 
discrepancy between coders had a large detrimental e ffec t on the 
r e l ia b i l i t y .  Secondly, the description of this category called for 
coding behaviors that communicated in f le x ib i l i t y .  At the same time, 
one of the areas of Category I I I  (Pressure Tactics) called for coding 
behaviors that rejected the other team's offers. Consequently, a 
statement such as, "We w ill not accept that!" could fa l l  into both 
categories. I t  would appear then that greater r e l ia b i l i t y  could be 
achieved for CS2 by: 1) extending the training and practice sessions,
2) c larify ing the definitions of each category, and/or 3) expanding
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the coding scheme by breaking some categories down into more specific 
categories.
Research Questions
The f i r s t  research question calls for a qualita tive  
comparison of the subjects' primary orientations toward power in 
connection with the behaviors they see as powerful and the behaviors 
they exhibit when bargaining. The power orientation scale measures 
six d ifferent orientations toward power: power as good, power as
an instinctive drive, power as charisma, power as resource 
dependency, p o lit ica l power, and power as control and autonomy. 
Complete scores for each subject on each dimension can be found in 
Table 13 (Appendix 1). Since each orientation is determined by a 
differen t number of items on the POS, i t  was necessary to collapse 
the scores by dividing the subjects' total scores for each 
orientation by the number of items on the POS that contribute to that 
score. Table 6 shows the average total scores for each subject on 
each power orientation. Subjects' overall score for each orientation  
was computed by summing the ir  pre- and post-test averages.
Table 6 clearly i l lu s tra te s  that two members of the Union 
team see power as primarily p o lit ica l while one member primarily sees 
power as good. In addition, a l l  members of the Company team see 
power as good. Table 7, then, compares each subject's PPO with the 
number of tactics they suggested in each category of CS1. S im ilarly, 
Table 8 compares each subject's PPO with the number of tactics they 
identified  in each category of CS2.
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Table 6
Subjects' Average Total Scores on the POS
Orientation U1 U2 U3 Cl C2 C3
4. 4*
3.0
0.0
2.5
2.0
3.5
Subjects' primary orientation toward power (PPO)
;  • Table 7
Subjects' Power Orientation v_. Suggested Tactics (CS1)
Subject
PPO
U1
POL
U2
POL
U3
GOOD
Union Cl 
Total GOOD
: C2 
GOOD
C3
GOOD
Company
Total
I . 1 0 0 1 2 6 3 11
CS1 I I . 0 2 1 3 1 0 2 3
Category
I I I . 1 1 2 4 0 1 0 1
IV. 2 1 3 6 1 2 1 4
I .  Increase Amount of Information
I I .  Increase Specific ity of Information
I I I .  Restrict the Other Team
IV. Throw o f f  the Balance
Good 2.4 5.6 3.8* 3.2* 4.4*
Instinctive
Drive
.33 - .33 2.67 2.0 3.0
Charisma 1.5 3.5 3.0 -2.5 0.0
Dependency 3.75 4.5 -3 .5 1.5 .25
Polit ica l 4.0* 6.0* 2.0 0.0 - . 5
Control
Autonomy
2.75 2.75 -5.75 1.75 -2 .0
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Table 8
Subjects ' Power O rie n ta tio n  v. Id e n t if ie d  Tactics (CS2)
Subject
PPO
U1
POL
U2
POL
U3
GOOD
Union
Total
Cl
GOOD
C2*
GOOD
C3*
GOOD
Company
Total
I . 2 3 4 9 0 0 0 0
CS2 I I . 0 2 4 6 0 0 0 0
Category
I I I . 1 3 1 5 0 0 0 0
IV. 0 4 0 4 0 5 0 5
V. 3 5 0 8 0 2 0 2
*
Cl and C3 did not attend the videotape viewing session 
during which data for this coding scheme was generated.
I .  Logic & Reason
I I .  Dead Ends
I I I .  Give & Take
IV. Power Cues
V. Pressure Tactics
Differences in the number of suggestions in each category do 
not appear to be significant from one subject to another. There 
does, however seem to be a tendency for the two teams to suggest 
differen t categories of behavior. Table 7 shows that the Company 
team leaned heavily toward Category I (CS1) as a power ta c t ic ,  mostly 
due to the suggestions of C2. The Union team suggested four times 
more behaviors in Category I I I  than the Company. The most suggestions 
made by the Union team fe l l  into Category IV but the Company team had 
almost as many tactics suggested in that category. The comparison 
among and between subjects with the same primary power orientation  
does not reveal any clear pattern but the two teams do show different
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tendencies, at least.in  Categories I and I I I .  Specifically , the 
Company suggested increasing information as a way of gaining power 
while the Union suggested imposing restrictions on the other team as 
a way of gaining power. There is a clear logic to this in that, i f  
the Company gains power by increasing information, the Union can 
exert power by restricting them in that area.
Table 8 shows a variety of identified behaviors spread some­
what evenly across categories. For example, Ul, identified  behaviors 
belonging to Categories I ,  I I I ,  and V. The input offered by U2 was 
evenly distributed with a slight emphasis on Categories^ IV and V.
Thus, both subjects with p o lit ica l power as their primary orientation  
made more suggestions in Category V (Pressure Tactics) than any other. 
On the other hand, the two subjects with 'good' as th e ir  primary 
orientation show opposite patterns. Behaviors in Categories I ,  I I ,  
and I I I  were identified by U3 with none in. Categories IV and V. 
Consequently, C2 identified several behaviors in .Categories IV and V 
with none in I ,  I I ,  or I I I .  Either there is no connection between 
power orientation and identified power tactics or what is good to a 
Union bargainer is not so to the Company, bargainers and vice versa.
The second part of the f i r s t  research question calls for a 
comparison of the subjects' power orientation1with the bargaining 
behaviors they exhibited (as coded by the observers). This comparison
■* t
was made based on the number of coded behaviors agreed upon by the 
coders since the coding r e l ia b i l i t y  was so inconsistent. Table 9 
shows, for each subject, the number of behaviors coded into each 
category of CS1 . Table 10 shows the number of behaviors coded for 
each subject in each category of CS2.
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Table 9
Power O rien ta tion  v . Observed Behavior (CS1)
Subject
PPO
U1
POL
U2
POL
U3
GOOD
Union
Total
Cl
GOOD
C2
GOOD
C3
GOOD
Company
Total
I . 8 4 6 18 5 4 12 21
CS1 I I . 3 5 3 11 1 5 5 11
Category*
I I I . 1 4 2 7 1 7 4 12
IV. 4 5 1 10 3 8 3 14
*
I .  Increase Amount of Information
I I .  Increase Specific ity  of Information
I I I .  Restrict the Other Team
IV. Throw o ff  the Balance
Table 9 shows a re la t iv e ly  equal but dissimilar distribution  
of behaviors in each category for each subject. The two p o li t ic a l ly  
oriented subjects show highly dissimilar distributions of scores with 
U2's scores evenly spread across categories while U1 seems to rely  
quite a b i t  on Category I and very l i t t l e  on Category I I I .  Three 
subjects in the 'power as good' group show a d istinct tendency to 
choose Category I  over the others but again, so does UT, whose PPO 
is p o lit ica l power. A comparison of the team totals shows that both 
teams exhibit more behaviors in Category I but distribute th e ir  other 
behaviors d iffe ren tly  among the remaining categories.
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Table 10
Power O rie n ta tio n  v. Observed Behavior (CS2)
Subject
PPO
U1
POL
U2
POL
U3
GOOD
Union
Total
Cl
GOOD
C2
GOOD
C3
GOOD
Company
Total
I . 5 12 9 26 2 5 9 16
CS2 I I . 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 3
Category
I I I . 2 7 8 17 0 4 5 9
IV. 26 26 25 77 6 30 16 52
V. 2 3 7 12 2 2 5 9
*
I .  Love & Reason
I I .  Dead Ends
I I I .  Give & Take
IV. Power Cues
V. Pressure Tactics
Table 10, unlike Table 9, shows a very consistent distribution  
of coded behaviors across subjects. The observers coded substantially  
more behaviors in Category I I I  (Nonverbal Power Cues) for a ll  subjects. 
The next most preferred category, for a ll  subjects, Category I .
Category I I I  shows the th ird highest frequency of coded behaviors 
for everyone except Cl. Categories V and I I  consistently showed 
frequencies for the subjects. This result could indicate a highly 
predictable pattern of tactical preference on the part of the subjects 
(no matter what the ir  orientation).
The second research question calls for a comparison of the 
subjects' POS scores before and a fte r  the bargaining simulation.
Table 11 below reports the results of three SPSS correlated t- tes ts  
run on the data. These tests compared the POS pre-and post-test
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results for the Union team, the Company team, and a ll  subjects for  
each of the six orientations measured by the POS. Raw score means 
were used since a ll comparisons were made within orientations. This 
table shows no significant change in the subjects' power orientation  
scores, undoubtedly because the sample size was too small.
Table 11
Comparison of the Pre- and Post-Test
Means on the POS
Orientation* GOD IND CHM RED POL COA
Un Pre 
Un Post 
t  value
9.67 
10.0 
- .38
1.33
1.33 
0.0
3.67
1.67 
3.46
2.67
3.67 
- .48
4.0
4.0  
0.0
.33 
- .67 
.87
n = 3 
ns
Co Pre.: 
Co Post 
t  value
10.33
9.67
.38
2.33
5.67
-1.64
-1.33
- .33
- .65
3.33
2.33 
.65
0.0 
1.0 
- .65
2.33
2.00
.18
n = 3 
ns
Total pre 
Total post 
t  value
10.0
9.83
.18
1.83 
3,5 
- .96
1.16
.67
.50
3.0
3.0 
0.0
2.0 
2.5 
-  .70
1.3 . 
.67 
.67
n = 6 
ns
★
GOD = Good; IND = Instinctive Drive; CHM = Charisma;
RED = Resource Dependency; POL = P o lit ic a l;  COA = Control 
Autonomy
The third research question requires a qualita tive  comparison 
of three outcome measures of the bargaining interaction. The three 
types of data gathered from the subjects and observers were converted 
to percentages to provide a common unit for comparison. Table 12 
shows the percent of the total outcome attributed to the two teams 
according to: 1) the predetermined point values assigned to each
93
issue by the teams prior to the bargaining session, 2) the pie 
charts f i l le d  out by each subject during the post-simulation in te r ­
view session (see Appendix 2 ) ,  and 3) the total number of powerful 
behaviors coded by each observer for each team.
Table 12 il lu s tra tes  three important and interesting findings. 
F irs t ,  a ll  of the subjects indicated that the ir  own team came out 
ahead in the bargaining. Consequently everyone, at least in the ir  
own minds, won. Second, the teams overestimated the ir  percentage of 
the outcome by roughly the same amount. That is ,  the Company team 
members claimed for themselves 55 percent of the outcome—10 percent 
more than the pre-simulation scoring sheet indicates. S im ilarly , the 
Union team claimed 66.8 percent of the outcome for themselves, or
11.8 percent more than is indicated on the scoring sheet. Both teams, 
then, overestimated the ir  portion of the outcome by approximately 
the same amount. F inally , the coders showed an uncanny agreement with 
the pre-simulation scoring percentages. Individually, the coders 
(with the exception of Coder 1) distributed the number of observed 
power tactics in proportions very similar to the scoring sheet 
percentages. Even more surprising though is the fact that by 
averaging the coders' percentages, the Union comes out ahead 53.5 
percent to 46.5 percent--a mere 1.5 percent discrepancy from the 
scores that were predetermined by the teams prior to the bargaining 
session.
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Table 12
Comparison of Three Different Outcome 
Measures of Bargaining
Union Score (%) Company Score {%)
1. Simulation Scoring Sheet 55 45
2. Post-Simulation Pie Charts
Company 1 41 '■■■*' 59
Company 2 47 53
Company 3 47 53
Union 1 72 28
Union 2 66 34
Union 3 62.5 37.5
3. Observer Coding
Coder 1 (CS1) 46 54
Coder 2 (CS1) 53 47
Coder 3 (CS2) 60 40
Coder 4 (CS2) 55 45
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of this study have some important implications for 
the accepted notions about social power. This chapter w ill t ie  the 
results of the study with the theoretical issues raised in Chapter 2. 
Second, the methodological issues and lim itations of the study w ill be 
outlined. F ina lly , some suggestions for future research on power w ill  
be offered.
Theoretical Implications
The generation and use of participant generated coding 
schemes in this study proved quite useful in examining the extent to
i
which real bargainers understand and use power. A close examination 
of the coding schemes and the items which made up each category (see 
Appendix 4) proved highly instructive in determining which theories 
of power were represented by the subjects' comments and which were not.
The f i r s t  two categories of CS1 ( I .  Increase the Amount of 
Information and I I .  Increase the Specific ity of Information) contain 
suggestions from the subjects that represent several d ifferent  
theories. Most strongly represented is French and Raven's f ie ld  
theory (1959). Subjects' suggestions include references to reward 
power (e .g . ,  "indicate willingness to compromise"), expert power
i j  ■ ■
(e .g . ,  "show experience in bargaining"), and referent power
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(e .g . ,  "refer to personal relationships with members of the other 
team"). One problem here is that indicating a willingness to 
compromise is not a powerful move from the perspective of level of 
aspiration theory (Siegel & Fouraker, 1969). Level of aspiration 
theory suggests that power stems from making small, infrequent 
concessions and making them only a fte r  gaining concessions from the 
other party. Of course, a person could Say that he or she was w illing  
to compromise and s t i l l  make only small and infrequent concessions.
Two theoretical orientations are incongruously represented 
by the suggestion in these two categories. The f i r s t  problem arises 
from the suggestion that getting the other team to ta lk and keeping 
them talking are powerful tactics. One way of doing this is asking 
questions that demand an answer. This is recognized as a power 
related behavior by some relational perspective theorists (Bales,
1950 and Rogers & Farace, 1975). On the other hand, some proponents 
of the relational perspective see ta lk  time as an index of power 
(Golembiewski, 1962; Rogers & Farace, 1975; and Wilmot, et a l . ,  1981). 
Clearly i f  ta lk  time is power, then trying to get one's opponent to 
ta lk  is tantamount to giving away power.
The second problematic issue concerns the notion of 
information power (Raven, 1965). This notion assumes that knowing 
and expressing information that is unknown to another gives one 
power. This is represented in part, within both categories (e .g . ,  
"show an understanding of information about the industry," "give 
strong arguments," and "be clear about one's purpose"). However, 
other suggestions focus on getting the other team to express 
information (e .g . ,  "ask others to be specific," and "ask, 'what did
you mean?"'). Thus, the subjects see both giving and asking for  
information as forms of power. This might be explained by the 
following example: i f  A gets B to do most of the talking then A can
keep his or her information to him or herself, thus ensuring that A 
w ill have information unknown to B. Also, B1s information w ill  
become known to A thus reducing B's power. This f i t s  with the 
subjects' perception that keeping the other team talking w ill  provide 
more information about the ir  position and they might possible "talk  
themselves into a corner."
Category I I I  (Restrict the Other Team) is not c learly  
represented in the theoretical l i te ra tu re . Only three suggestions 
were sorted into this category ("do the writing oneself," "hold out 
for as long as possible," and "insist on a liv ing wage") but 18 
percent of the coded behaviors fe l l  into this category. Writing the 
contract language oneself could be considered a suggestion (Bales,
1950) or an offer (Donohue, 1978) but neither quite f i t s .  Essentially, 
these behaviors l im it  the number of options for the other team in 
that, i f  A writes the language for a particular clause, B is 
essentially limited to discussing the proposal A suggests. Simi­
la r ly ,  i f  B holds out by not discussing an issue then A cannot make 
any progress unless she or he wants to continue to make incremental 
concessions. The notion of lim iting options most closely reflects  
the mathematical/probabilities model where each choice by one party 
l im its  the options of the other. Watzlawick (1965) equates lim iting  
others' options with establishing rules in a relationship. S im ilarly ,  
Frost and Wilmot (1978) see rule-setting as a way of gaining power in
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a relationship. Clearly, restric ting options deserves more attention  
in power theory and research.
Throwing the Process of Balance (CS1, Category IV) contains
t
three d iffe ren t types of behavior found in the extant l i te ra tu re  and 
one type not easily classified. The f i r s t  type is threats, which are 
commonly associated with bargaining. Suggestion of this type include, 
"threaten to s tr ike ,"  "threaten to close the plant," and "threaten 
to f i l e  an unfair labor practice su it."  Threats are recognized as 
power moves by social exchange theorists (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; 
Homans, 1974; and Bacharach & Lawler, 1980), f ie ld  theorists (French & 
Raven, 1959), relational perspective researchers (Donohue, 1978), 
and mathematical/probabi1it ie s  theorists (Deutsch & Krauss, 1962 and 
Tedeschi, 1969). The second behavior type represented in this 
category is disconfirmation (e .g . ,  "doodling," "calling o ff  the 
bargaining session," and "stomping out of the room"). Disconfirmation 
is identified  as a power move in the l ite ra tu re  only by the conver­
sational control researchers, Rogers and Farace (1975). The third  
type of behavior in this category is missing from most studies of 
power and control. Nonverbal behavior was recognized and suggested 
by the subjects as playing a role in exercising power at the 
bargaining table (e .g . ,  "doodling," "beating on the table," "blow 
smoke at the other team," and "stomp out of the room"). Folger and 
Si l ia rs  (1977) insist that nonverbal cues play an important role in 
influencing people's perceptions of power and yet few studies have 
attempted to systematically code and analyze this type of behavior 
in relation ;to power. The. two remaining suggestions in this 
category are "do the unexpected—go against your patterns or your
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reputation" and "scream and ye ll while another, team member 
conciliates." These behaviors might be called mixed messages in 
that they are designed to defy the other team's expectations. They 
would probably be very hard .to code because bargainer's expectations 
are rarely known. All the behaviors in this category serve to confound 
and confuse the other team.
Like the f i r s t  category of CS1, Category I of CS2 focuses 
on information but in a s lightly  d ifferen t vein. The behaviors 
subjects identified in this category (Logic and Reasoning) were 
related to giving and requesting information (e .g . ,  "cite s ta tis tics"  
and "I would l ike  to hear more about (X )"). More common, however, 
were behaviors focusing on denying or questioning the logic of the 
other team (e .g . ,  "extend th e ir  arguments so they appear unrealistic"  
or "ask, ' is  i t  in your best interest to allow that? '" ) .  Denials 
and questions have been used in previous research (Bales, 1950;
Rogers & Farace, 1975; and Donohue, 1978) as indices of power but the 
questions in this category are quite specific in that they appear to 
function as denials or counterarguments. Perhaps this category could 
be s p li t  to separate giving one's own logic and information from 
denying or calling into question the other's logic and information.
Category I I  (Dead Ends) contains behaviors that serve to set 
the lim its  of the discussion. These lim its  are set by qualified  
threats ( e .g . , "the alternative might be the complete close down of 
the plant") and by absolute language and metaphors (e .g . ,  "we 
absolutely could not accept that," "we w ill have no more movement 
on the contract whatsoever," and "we are at the end of our rope"). 
Threats, as has been mentioned several times already, are widely
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discussed in the lite ra tu re  but the use of language and metaphor to 
indicate end points and lim its is not discussed in any detail by 
power or bargining theorists. This would appear to be a particularly  
f ru i t fu l  area of study i f  we are to understand how lim its are set in 
bargaining interactions.
Give and Take (Category I I I )  strongly reflects the principles 
Of social exchange theory, equity.theory, and fieldctheory. All of 
the identified behaviors in this category-relate to rewards and costs, 
particu larly  in terms of balancing the^two. Rewarding includes 
making a better o ffer (e .g . ,  "we--wi.ll double our wage o f fe r" ) ,  
accepting an o ffer with reservations (e.g. "we do not l ik e  i t  but 
we w ill 1ive w i t h - i t " ) , or referring to rewards already given (e .g . ,  
"we have given you (X) on (Y) issue"). Equity theory (Spector, 1977) 
is represented by behaviors which serve to balance costs and rewards 
(e .g . ,  "we are close to agreement but s t i l l  fa r  apart on (X)" and 
"You w il l  get what you want i f  you go along with (X )" ).
Category IV (Power Cues) is the most easily distinguishable 
in that a ll  the behaviors identified  and sorted into this category 
are nonverbal. This study is one of the f i r s t  attempts to id entify ,  
categorize, and code the impact of nonverbal cues on perceptions of 
power. Although a ll the nonverbal cues were put into this one 
category, there seem to be three d ifferen t types of behavior 
represented. F irs t ,  the subjects identified  behaviors that show 
disinterest or disconfirmation (e .g . ,  "avoid eye contact," "put your 
pen away," and "look at your watch"). Secondly, there are behaviors 
that provide emphasis (e .g . ,  "raising or lowering one's voice," and 
"rapping the tab le"). F ina lly , there are direct responses, both
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positive (e .g . ,  "taking notes") and negative (e .g . ,  "shaking one's 
head"). Interrupting was also identified as a power move, supporting 
the work of various relational perspective researchers (Mischler & 
Waxier, 1968; Turk & Bell, 1972; Hadley & Jacob, 1973; Rogers &
Farace, 1975; and Donohue, 1978). Folger and S illa rs  (1977) suggested 
that nonverbal cues play an important role in establishing and
exercising power and this study bears out that argument in that 58 _ >
percent of the coded behaviors fe l l  into this category. Clearly, 
there is a need for further research to define the d ifferen t types 
of nonverbal power cues and to measure the ir  impact on perceptions 
of re la tive  power.
The last category of CS2, Pressure Tactics, is the most 
diverse and d i f f ic u l t  to define. I t  includes references to time 
l im its as well as veiled threats (e .g . ,  "you are getting paid more 
than people on unemployment"). The most frequently identified  
behavior in this category however, is the rejection of an offer  
through the use of insults or emotional language (e .g . ,  "I am 
offended by that o ffe r ,"  "that is an embarrassing proposal," "we 
would be laughed out of the unionhall," e tc . ) .  The particular use 
of language here indicates that a proposal is not worthy of 
consideration and that the other team w ill have to make another, 
more acceptable proposal i f  any progress is to be made. I t  is not 
just a rejection, i t  is v ir tu a lly  a demand that the other team make 
a new proposal in order to save face. The use of emotional language 
and labels is what makes this category of behaviors stand out from 
the rest. Perhaps emotional language deserves a category by i t s e l f ,  
separate from threats._and time pressures.
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The behaviors suggested, id en tif ied , and used by the subjects 
in this study represent, in part, each of the theories reviewed in 
Chapters 1 and 2. I t  can be concluded, then, that people do see 
power in terms of information, expertise, rewards and costs, threats, 
interruptions, questions, discontinuations, and limited options. I f  
power theory is to fu l ly  account for how naive participants view and 
exercise power, however, several additional considerations must be 
explored.
F irs t ,  a system must be developed for classifying nonverbal 
behavior and measuring its  influence on perceptions of power. This 
study showed that nonverbal cues can be used to show d isinterest, to 
d is tract, to disconfirm, to emphasize:, and to respond. With 58 
percent of the coded behaviors fa l l in g  into the nonverbal cues 
category, i t  is clear that the coders see nonverbal cues as playing 
an important role in enhancing or communicating power related 
messages. The subjects too, when asked to look at the nonverbal 
cues, readily and frequently identified behaviors on the videotapes 
that they saw as power attempts. I t  would seem that this area is 
particu larly  important to future research on power.
Second, the impact of language on perceptions of power should 
be accounted fo r. Absolute and emotional language both appear to 
play a significant role in the exercise of power at the bargaining 
table, at least in the eyes of the bargainers. Third, threats were 
sorted into d ifferent categroies, largely due to differences in the 
language used. There seem to be three d ifferen t types of threats,
1) d irect (e .g . ,  "there is a very re a l . probability of a s tr ik e") ,
2) conditional (e .g . ,  "our alternative to this o ffer  would be a ;
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close down of the p lant"), and 3) veiled (e .g . ,  "you are making more 
now than i f  you were on unemployment"). These d ifferen t types of 
threats seem to represent d ifferen t types of pressure just as 
absolute language seems to generate more pressure than emotional 
language. Some method must be developed for identifying the degree 
of power represented by these d ifferen t uses of language.
Furthermore, the use of logic must be accounted fo r . .  C learly, 
giving information can enhance power'as Raven (1965) suggests but 
that information or logic may not go unquestioned or unchallenged. 
Information seems to be related to power'in a number of d ifferent
ways. Power,can .be .enhanced by haying in.formation„and keeping i t  
to oneself, sharing important information at the proper time, 
gathering information from one's opponents, denying the importance 
of the opponent's information, and showing the opponent's information 
to be inaccurate. Conversely, information can be detrimental to 
one's power i f . i t  is shared too free ly , shared at the wrong time, 
or inaccurate.. In any case, a clear understanding of the dynamics 
of power in bargaining interactions requires some method of 
following the flow of information, arguments, and counterarguments.
F inally , some account must be taken of rule-making and ru le-  
breaking behavior. Categories such as Dead Ends, Restricting the 
Other, and Throwing o ff  the Balance seem to play an important role 
in either focusing or changing the pattern of interaction between 
the parties. Rule-breaking can help equalize one party's power when 
the rule structure supports a power imbalance just as rule-making 
behavior can enhance one's power by setting up an equal power 
structure. . I f  Watzlawick (1976) is r ight in proposing that each
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behavior in a relationship serves to create, reinforce, or modify 
the rules in that relationship , then more attention must be given 
to this area especially in bargaining research.
In general, the two coding schemes were not q u a lita tive ly  
d iffe ren t although they were generated from two d iffe ren t sets of 
data. This would indicate that the subjects have fa ir ly  consistent 
defin itions of power. The one major exception to th is rule is the 
prominence of the nonverbal cue category in CS2. I t  is only natural 
that the subjects would be able to id en tify  more nonverbal behaviors 
while watching a videotape than they could just relying on th e ir  
memories. That is , i t  is much harder to remember someone's nonverbal 
cues than i t  is to note them as they appear on a videotape.
With the exception of the nonverbal power cues category, the 
two coding schemes are very much a lik e . Both focus on information 
giving and receiving. In fa c t, taking ju s t .the verbal behavior 
categories into account, the information, logic, and argument 
oriented suggestions, fo r CS1 accounted for 54 percent of the 
suggestions as compared to 46.6 percent information oriented 
suggestions for CS2. As fo r the coded behaviors, 58.6 percent of 
the coded behaviors were in the information related categories of 
CS1 while 62.3 percent of the to tal number of coded behaviors were 
placed in the information related categories o f CS2. So there is a 
strong tendency for power to be defined as a function of the way 
that information is exchanged in a bargaining interaction.
The remaining verbal categories for the two coding schemes 
revolve around restric ting  the other, being in fle x ib le , pressuring, 
and rejecting o ffers . With as l i t t l e  difference as there is between
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the coding schemes i t  might be possible to combine and refine them 
fo r use in future research since subjects appear to define power 
related behavior consistently whether i t  be immediately a fte r  a 
bargaining task or la te r ,  while watching videotapes.
Bargainers apparently see power as hinging on the strategic
flow of information. They seem to take th e ir  cues as to the lim its
of each others' positions from sometimes subtle lin g u is tic  cues.
When those lim its  are being tested they are lik e ly  to resort to some
form of threat as a warning. Teams may ignore these warnings and
send discontinuing messages. They may also resort to establishing 
or breaking rules or expectations in order to ca p ita lize  on or a lte r  
a perceived power imbalance.
The results of this study showed no s ign ifican t change in the 
subjects1 orientations toward power according.-to the POS. There is 
some question, however, as to the usefulness of knowing a given 
ind ividual's  orientation . Although two subjects had a d iffe ren t 
primary orientation than the others, neither the behaviors they saw 
as powerful nor the behaviors they exhibited in the bargaining wer 
s ig n ifican tly  d iffe ren t than those iden tified  and exhibited by the 
other members of the bargaining teams. In fa c t, an examination of 
the distribution of coded behaviors (using CS2) indicated that a ll of 
the bargainers exhibited v ir tu a lly  the same pattern'of-behavior in 
th is  simulation. Bargainers apparently do d if fe r  in primary 
orientations toward power but that has l i t t l e  to do with th e ir  
defin ition  or use of power related behaviors.
The fin a l theoretical issue explored in th is study concerned 
the relationship between se lf-rep orts , outcome measures, and observer
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coding of a bargaining in teraction . The use of m ultiple measures 
of power has a long history in the lite ra tu re  (L ip p itt , et a l . ,
1952; Mischler & Waxier, 1968; Turk & B ell, 1972; Hadley & Jacob,
1973; Turk, 1974; Klopper, e t a l . ,  1978; and Donohue, 1978). For 
the most part, these studies have fa iled  to find correlations  
between the d iffe ren t measures. Those that have found correlations 
used in tact groups, analogic se lf-rep ort measures, and theory-based 
coding schemes.
This study was successful in correlating observer coding 
with a participant-generated outcome measure. I t  is not surprising 
that the subjects' self-reports did not correlate with the other 
measures since both teams saw themselves as coming out ahead in the 
bargaining. Obviously, the teams had d iffe ren t p r io r it ie s  which 
allowed them to see themselves as "winners." However, these 
p rio rit ie s  were already reflected in the objective outcome measure 
since the point value of each otucome fo r each team was assigned by 
the team i ts e l f .
I t  seems odd that an outcome measure based on the teams' own 
p rio rit ie s  would correlate highly with observers' coding but not with 
the post-bargaining perceptions of the subjects who set the p r io rit ie s  
in the f i r s t  place. However, I l l ic h  (1980) defines bargaining power 
as the a b ility  to get others to do what you want by convincing them 
that i t  is in th e ir  own best in terest. Perhaps both teams arrived  
at desirable outcomes because they were convinced that those outcomes 
were in th e ir  own best in terest. The change in p r io rit ie s  brought 
about by the teams' exercise of bargaining power could cause the low 
correlations between the predetermined scores on each issue and the
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subjects' post-bargaining perceptions. That is , outcomes that 
appeared undesirable prio r to bargaining appeared more desirable 
a fte r  the negotiations were finished because of successful power 
attempts by the opposing team(s). In addition, the subjects' comments 
about power following the negotiation might focus on the tactics the 
other team used that brought.about a change in p r io r it ie s . I f  this  
was the case, i t  would explain why the coding scheme(s) generated 
from the subjects' post-simulation comments would more accurately 
re fle c t the re la tive  power of the parties than the subjects' own 
view of who "won."
In summary, subjects see power s im ilarly  to the defin itions  
suggested by social exchange.theory, f ie ld  theory, 
psychological theories, the relational perspective, and the mathe­
matical probabilities model. However, these theories do not 
adequately explain a ll the behaviors the subjects saw as power tactics. 
Further explanations of the function of nonverbal cues, threats, 
absolute and emotional language, and.rules are necessary to provide 
a comprehensive view of how people see and use power. Further, i t  
is clear that d iffe ren t individuals have d iffe ren t orientations  
toward power but the e ffec t of th is orientation on one's defin ition  
of power and one's use and choice of power tactics in unclear.
F in a lly , subjects were unable to match th e ir  view of the bargaining 
outcome with a predetermined scoring system derived from the subjects' 
own perceptions of th e ir  bargaining p r io rit ie s . On the other hand, 
observers using a coding scheme derived from the subjects' post­
bargaining perceptions were able to approximate the objective outcome 
measure .through .the use of behavioral coding.
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Methodological Issues
Three innovative research techniques were used -in this study 
in an attempt to enhance the v a lid ity  of the coding schemes and the 
outcome measure, and to increase the correlations between the outcome 
measure, the coding resu lts , and the subjects' se lf-reports . These 
techniques were: 1) generating the coding schemes from the subjects'
perceptions of power, 2) using an outcome measure based on the 
subjects' pre-bargaining p r io r it ie s , and 3) using an analog measure 
of subjects' perceptions of the re la tive  power relationship between 
the two teams. Each of these techniques w ill be discussed here along 
with the lim ita tio n s 'o f th§^study.
Theoretical defin itions of power d if fe r  to such an extent 
that no single theory can be said to adequately conceptualize power. 
Nevertheless, researchers continue to code interactions and draw 
conclusions about power using coding schemes generated from purely 
theoretical notions (Bales, 1950; Rogers & Farace, 1975; and 
Donohue, 1978). The v a lid ity  of theory based coding categories is 
questionable at best. This study generated two coding schemes, both 
en tire ly  from the subjects' own defin itions and perceptions of power. 
The purpose of th is procedure was to generate categories with b u ilt in 
v a lid ity . Two coding schemes were generated because two sets of data 
were used. The two schemes were kept separate so that any differences 
in categories or in the outcome of the coding could be accounted fo r.
I t  was, of course, possible for the subjects to give q u a lita tiv e ly  
d iffe re n t responses immediately following the bargaining' simulation 
than they did during the videotape viewing session. Keeping the two
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coding schemes separate controlled fo r that. As discussed e a rlie r  
in th is chapter, the differences were minimal.
The problem with the coding schemes in th e ir present form is 
the lack of sp ec ific ity . The categories are too general. Since the 
categories re fle c t many of the theoretical approaches to power while 
at the same time including new information not addressed in trad itional 
power theories, th is  procedure seems highly desirable. As suggested 
e a r lie r , the categories from the two coding schemes could be combined 
and then broken down more sp ec ifica lly . With some revision and 
redefin ition  a higher degree of sorting agreement could be achieved.
The close agreement between the coding outcome and the objective 
outcome measure is promising. This method of generating coding 
categories fo r analyzing power should certain ly be pursued. One 
additional improvement on th is procedure would be to use a larger 
subject population to draw the raw data from. This would ensure a 
greater variety of responses and a more valid  and generalizable 
end product.
As with trad itional coding schemes,.most outcome measures 
used in bargaining^studies, are theoretica lly  derived. I t  is often 
assumed that when negotiating.a monetary issue, the midpoint between 
the two parties' positions is the equitable, equally desirable 
outcome. This approach to ta lly  ignores Walton and McKersie's notion 
of subjective expected u t i l i t ie s  (1965). Bargainers, particu larly  
when they are dealing with more than one issue, rarely have the 
same outcome value for any given settlement point. Consequently, i t  
is a mistake to assume that anyone other than the parties themselves 
can accurately assign outcome values to any given outcome. For this
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reason, the subjects in this study were asked .to assign th e ir own 
values to the possible settlement points on each of the four issues 
(see Simulation Scoring Sheet--Appendix 3).
The problem with this procedure was that by assigning a 
lim ited number of possible settlement points to each issue, the 
bargainers' f le x ib i l i ty  was unnecessarily lim ited. As proof, one of 
the teams added a settlement point and assigned a value,to i t  because 
they did not lik e  any of the possible settlements available. This 
made the scoring for that issue very d if f ic u lt  because they had an
extra item while the other team did not. Even though the actual
settlement did not include that item, the team had assigned points
to i t  that otherwise could have added to th e ir score elsewhere. I f
th is procedure is to be used in the fu ture, the teams should be 
allowed to generate th e ir  own l is t  of options prior to the bargaining 
session. Then by combining both l is ts  and having the teams assign 
values to the options, the two teams w ill at least have a common l is t  
of the p o ss ib ilities . That way the fin a l outcome scores would be 
more comparable.
The fin a l innovation in th is study was the use of "pie charts" 
to measure the subjects' view of who came out ahead in the bargaining. 
Berger (1980) suggests that most fa ilu res  to correlate subject s e lf-  
reports of overall power with other outcome measures are due to the 
fa c t that power is a relational concept. As such i t  is d i f f ic u lt  to 
measure by simply asking subjects who the most powerful party was. 
Bochner (1978) suggests.that power is an analogical concept and should 
be measured using analogical data.
In an attempt to apply these notions, subjects were asked 
to divide "pies" for each issue to visually  represent which team 
got most of what they wanted in the bargaining. I t  was hoped that 
this method would produce more specific and more accurate information 
about how the subjects viewed the re la tiv e  power of the parties than 
merely asking, "who was the most powerful?" As previously mentioned, 
a ll  the subjects indicated that th e ir  own team won. This did nothing 
to promote the correlation between self-reports and .the objective 
outcome measure but i t  was an interesting finding, in its  own rig h t. 
However interesting the results might be, there is no evidence that 
the use of the "pie charts" is  any more or less valid or re lia b le  
than any other gross otucome measure.
This study suffered from three major lim ita tions. F irs t , 
was the excessively small subject population. The a v a ila b ility  of 
professional bargainers in the Missoula, Montana area was prohibitive  
in th is  respect. Perhaps a larger metropolitan area would have a 
larger population from which to recru it subjects. The.researcher 
is s t i l l  firm ly convinced that using experienced bargainers is  
preferable to using subjects with no bargaining experience. The 
second weakness was the fa ilu re  to use in tact groups. Once again, 
i t  was impossible to recru it in tact bargaining teams. The best 
results in finding correlations between various measures of power 
have occurred in studies u t iliz in g  in ta c t, ongoing groups (Klopper, 
et a l . ,  1978). F ina lly , the sorting and coding procedures used to 
generate and apply the coding schemes need to be refined. The 
low r e l ia b i l i t y  figures for most of the categories severely lim it  the 
u t i l i t y  of these findings. Time lim ita tions prevented the researcher
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from retraining the coders and recoding the data to achieve high 
coder r e l ia b i l i ty .  The results of the second coding using CS2 are 
promising enough, however, to indicate that more "extensive training  
could have produced an acceptable level of coder agreement. Further 
suggestions for the revision and future use of the coding schemes 
have already been offered. O verall, the results of th is study are 
quite promising and suggestive of the following directions for future 
research.
Future Research
Subsequent research would do well to follow up on the 
procedures used here to generate participant-based coding schemes. 
Researchers using larger subject populations could co llect a large 
pool of power tactics that could then be sorted and checked until an 
acceptable level of agreement was achieved. Coders should be trained  
using several fifte e n  minute t r ia l  sessions until acceptable coder 
r e l ia b i l i t y  is achieved. Having arrived at a re lia b le  set of 
discrete categories the results of the coding could be compared to 
the coding results of theory-based coding schemes to determine which 
type of coding correlates best with participant self-reports and 
objective outcome measures.
Research leading to the generation of a valid and re liab le  
coding system for measuring power is best carried out in the 
laboratory. However, when r e l ia b i l i ty  and v a lid ity  have been tested 
and achieved researchers can begin to videotape and analyze actual 
negotiation sessions to further tes t the g e n era lizab ility  of the 
findings. Outcome measures for comparisons should d e fin ite ly  take
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into account the subjects' own p r io r it ie s . Subjects could be asked 
to assign values to the possible settlement points both before and 
a fte r the bargaining session.
I f  a larger subject population were used a wider variety of 
power orientations might be represented. This would allow the
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researcher to s ta t is t ic a lly  test subjects' change in orientation and 
differences in th e ir  choices of tactics with a greater chance of 
achieving meaningful results.
The e ffec t of language on perceptions of bargaining power 
could be tested. Teams could be trained in the use of various types 
of threats or varying degrees of absolute and/or emotional language. 
Subjects could then be assigned to d iffe ren t bargaining sessions 
where one team's language or use of threats is manipulated so that 
the e ffec t on the other team's perception of power can be measured.
The e ffec t of nonverbal cues on perceptions of power could 
be examined through the use of videotapes. Observers could watch 
and code videotapes with varying types and amounts of nonverbal cues 
to determine the effects on coded power behavior. One especially  
useful method might be for subjects to comment on th e ir  own tapes 
a fte r viewing them without sound.
F in a lly , some determination should be made to discover 
whether or not certain categories of behavior have more force than 
others. Donohue (1968) attempted to measure power by assigning 
d iffe ren t weights to d iffe ren t categories but his weighting system 
was largely a rb itra ry . I t  stands to reason that a single behavior 
of one type could have more impact than a single behavior of another 
type. Consequently, i t  is important to develop some method of
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measuring the in tensity of power related behaviors fo r the purposes 
of coding more accurately.
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY
Power is an integral aspect of a ll human relationships 
(Rozinski, 1965). I t  is considered, by some, to be the most crucial 
variable in managing co n flic t (Duke, 1976). Despite the widespread 
concern about power dynamics, or perhaps because o f i t ,  there is 
s t i l l  no comprehensive conceptualization or de fin ition  of power.
As our population grows and becomes more mobile i t  becomes 
increasingly important that we learn to deal with our d ifferences-- 
our conflicts--more e ffe c tiv e ly . Part of that is gaining a clearer 
understanding of power relationships and how we can exercise, share, 
and equalize power.
This study attempted to resolve several problematic conceptual 
issues raised by Duke (1976) as a f i r s t  step to defining and measuring 
power. Secondly, six major theories of social interaction were 
reviewed to determine the commonalities and discrepancies in th e ir  
approaches to power. This review of the lite ra tu re  yielded a 
defin ition  of power as a re la tiv e  concept. That is , power is  
exercised by a ll parties in a relationship and so its  dynamics are 
specific to a given s ituation . In addition, i t  can be e ither shared 
or exercised prim arily by just one party and i t  is seen as both an 
available resource and as a possession of those exercising i t .
115
116
Because of the many and varied theoretical defin itions o f 
power, power researchers have shown l i t t l e  agreement about its  
operational d e fin itio n . Power has been studied as a function of 
outcomes, of actors' potential fo r influence, of actors' perceptions, 
and of th e ir actual behavior. Few correlations have been found among 
these various measures partly  because: 1) studies frequently used
student groups whose predictions about each other's power had l i t t l e  
base in experience, 2) outcome measures were th eoretica lly  derived 
while self-reports were based on subject perceptions, 3) coding schemes 
used to analyze interactions were theory-based thus making the 
subjects' behavior f i t  the theory instead of vice versa, and 4) 
d ig ita l measures of the subjects' perceptions were inadequate to 
measure the analogic way people define and act out power in th e ir  
relationships.
This study attempted to resolve some of these problems in 
its  methodology. F irs t , the subjects used here were experienced 
bargainers. They were divided into two three-person bargaining 
groups. They carried out a one hour simulated bargaining session 
while being filmed by two videotape cameras. The subjects were 
interviewed about th e ir  impressions of the influence tactics used 
during the bargaining session. This interview data was used to 
generate the f i r s t  participant perception based coding scheme. The 
subjects returned a week la te r to view the videotapes and were asked 
to iden tify  the statements and behaviors that indicated the use of 
power. Their responses provided the raw data fo r the second 
participant perception based coding scheme. The two sets of data 
were sorted, categorized,,and sorted again to generate two d ifferen t
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coding schemes fo r use in analyzing the videotapes. Four observers 
were then trained and asked to code the videotapes (two coders used 
one coding scheme, and two more used, the other).
The findings revealed no readily predictable patterns of 
behavior except that giving and receiving information or logical 
arguments tends to make up the bulk of the bargaining interaction.
One interesting result was the frequent coding of nonverbal behavior 
as an index of power. In addition, subject responses indicated that 
language use plays an important role in perceptions of power.
Subjects with d iffe ren t orientations toward power apparently do not 
define or use power d iffe re n tly  as evidenced by the universal pattern 
of behaviors observed using the second coding scheme. F in a lly , the 
use of participant perception based coding schemes allowed the 
observers to closely match the objective outcome measure of the 
bargaining in th e ir coding.
In conclusion, the use of subject responses to generate 
coding categories is highly recommended. This procedure w ill aid in 
revising power theory to meet actual human behavior. More attention  
should be paid to how language use reflects  the use and balance of 
power in a relationship. More work is needed in developing an 
adequate se lf-report measure of the subjects' perceptions of th e ir  
power relationships. Also, nonverbal cues appear to play an important 
role in influencing perceptions of power. That ro le deserves fu rther, 
more detailed study. F in a lly , the development of a method of 
measuring varying in tensities  of power related behaviors might be 
helpful in explaining why bargaining participants' perceptions of 
outcome are so diverse.
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APPENDIX 1 
PRE- AND POST-SESSION QUESTIONNAIRE
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This packet contains several questions designed to measure 
your general orientation toward bargaining, c o n flic t, and decision- 
making. The results w ill be used to determine the amount of change 
in your orientation during the course of this experiment ( i f  any), 
and to explore the connection between your general orientation and 
your specific bargaining behavior.
Completion and return of this questionnaire is the f i r s t  
step in the research project. I t  constitutes written consent to 
partic ipate in this experiment. You are, however, free to withdraw 
from th is research project at any time i f  you wish. I f  you have any 
questions or concerns about the study do not hesitate to ask.
DECISION MAKING BEHAVIOR
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For each of the following statements, choose the description that 
best characterizes the way you think or act when making decisions 
and/or bargaining.
1. When the group is making a decision I:
  Passively defer to others.
 Try to get a decision that sa tisfies everyone without
worrying about how good i t  is .
 Look en tire ly  at the merits of a decision without thinking
about how the members of the group feel or how satisfied  
they are.
  Look fo r decisions that work, though I might not personally
think they are the best.
 Try to get strong, creative decisions with a common basis
fo r understanding among group members.
2. When the group is facing a decision I:
 Show l i t t l e  in terest in the decision or the other group
members.
 Think mostly about how people in the group get along,
without worrying what the decision w ill be.
  Push fo r a re a lly  good decision, and view the other members
as only providing resources fo r helping make a better 
decision.
   Try to get good relations among the members and a good
solution, though w illing  to sacrifice a T i t t le  of both to 
get the job done.
 Avoid compromise and work for everyone to agree to and be
satisfied with a decision that is based upon looking at the 
situation in a re a lis tic  way.
3. When my group is making a decision I:
 Wait fo r the group to te l l  me what to do and■accept what
they recommend for me.
  Help others participate by giving moral Support to members
and by testing to see i f  members can agree.
 Give information, evaluate how well the group is working
toward the task, set ground rules fo r behavior, and see that 
everyone stays at the task.
 Summarize periodically  what has been discussed, ca ll for
things to be made c lear, and encourage people to compromise.
  Help the group think of a lternatives, discuss how practical
they are, and work out ways by which the group can come to 
an agreement.
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4. When I  find myself disagreeing with other members of the group I:
  Stand by my ideas and continue to defend my position,
actively trying to get i t  accepted by the group and 
incorporated into any decisions made for as long as i t  
takes to do so.
 Try to explore the points of agreement and disagreement
and the feelings that other group members have about these 
points and why; I press a search for alternatives that take 
everyone's views into account.
5. Controversies are:
 Valuable to clear the a ir  and enhance involvement and
commitment and, when productively handled, resu lt in 
increased c re a tiv ity .
 Destructive because opposition leads to d is lik e , and
disagreement over ideas means personal rejection of other 
group members.
6. When I am involved in a controversy I:
  Feel rather fearfu l and concerned about how other members
Tike me and whether I re a lly  lik e  them.
 Feel angry at th e ir ignorance and rather annoyed that I
have to be around such stupid people.
 Am stimulated and feel fu ll  o f excitement and /fun as I
think about the issues being discussed.
7. Which of the following is more typical of your behavior?
  When I find myself in disagreement with other group members
I always state my position and feelings so that everything 
is out in the open.
 When I find myself in disagreement with other group members,
I keep quiet and "s it the discussion out."
8. When I get involved in a good argument I :
  Find my ideas becoming more and more creative as I
incorporate other members' ideas and notions and begin to 
see the issue from d iffe ren t perspectives.
  Become more and more certain that I am correct and argue
more and more strongly fo r my point of view.
9. When I have a co n flic t o f in terest with other group members I:
 Focus on the need for mutual cooperation and the areas of
s im ila rity  between our needs and positions.
  Focus on the superiority of my position and whether I win
or whether they win.
10. When other group members and I have a co n flic t of in terest I:
  Try to increase my power and use i t  to push for acceptance
of my position.
  Try to equalize power and push for a creative agreement
that a ll members can liv e  with.
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11. When I am involved in a co n flic t of in terest with other group 
members I:
  Let members know my position is fle x ib le  in order to help
in creative problem solving.
- >■. Let members know that I am committed to my position in
order to force the other members to give in and agree.
12. When I have a co n flic t of in terest with other group members I:  
 Use threats and express h o s tility  to force them to accept
my position.
   Avoid threats in order to reduce the other's defensiveness
and express h o s tility  to free myself from angry feelings  
that might in terfere  with cooperation in the future.
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INSTRUCTIONS: Mark each statement in the l e f t  margin according to how 
much you agree or disagree with i t .  Please mark every one. Write 
+1, +2, +3 or -1 , -2 , -3 depending on how you feel in each case.
+1 I agree a l i t t l e  - I I  disagree a l i t t l e
+2 I agree on the whole -2 I disagree on the whole
+3 I agree very much -3 I disagree very much
_ 1. An advantage of having power is being able to get people to 
follow your orders.
_ 2. People in powerful positions are often rewarded fo r doing 
very l i t t l e .
_ 3. Having power gives you independence. -
_ 4. An advantage of being in a position of power is that people 
seem to tre a t you as somebody special.
_ 5. In the long run, i t  is better to avoid having power.
_ 6. Knowing things others do not know gives you power over them.
_ 7. You know you have power .when'other people must come to you 
fo r things they need. ■
_ 8. An advantage to being considered powerful is that other 
people want to be lik e  you.
_ 9. A person can be powerful within one group and not within  
another.
_10. There is no such thing as power without a purpose.
_11. The drive fo r power exists in a ll  of us.
_12. An advantage of being in a position of power is being able 
to control the rewards and punishments of others.
_13. Powerful people are cautious about whom they confide in .
14. Success and power go hand in hand.
_15. I f  you have power, you have a sense of security.
_16. The responsibility and challenge of power is exciting.
_17. People seek power fo r its  own sake.
_18. Power is something to be avoided.
_19. Having information that others want and need gives a person
a great deal of power.
_20. People know they are powerful when others are dependent on 
them.
_21. People usually deserve the power they get.
“22. How much power a person has varies considerably from one
situation to another.
_23. People naturally try  to avoid feeling powerless.
24. Powerful people are easy to recognize, even in situations  
where they do nothing to demonstrate th e ir power.
_25. Sometimes powerful people cannot avoid hurting others.
“26. The meek shall in h erit the earth.
J27. Power means the a b il ity  to beat the competition.
_28. I t  takes p o litic a l s k ill to become powerful.
“29. Sometimes i t  is-necessary for a powerful person to te l l  
people what they should think.
_30. • An advantage to having power is the freedom i t  gives you.
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31.. You can usually te l l  a powerful person as soon as he or she 
enters a room.
32. I would lik e  to be a powerful person.
33. Power comes from being an expert in something.
34. People in s tin c tive ly  seek power.
35. Whether power is good or bad depends on the type of person 
who has i t .
36. Power should be used to do the greatest good fo r the 
greatest number of people.
37. In general, powerful people do more harm than good.
38. Having power means that people may not lik e  you.
39. Powerful people are lik e ly  to feel anxious.
40. Remaining in power requires p o litic a l ski 11.
POWER ORIENTATION SCALE
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Scoring Sheet
Add a constant of +4 to item responses, reversing those responses 
where indicated. Total the items within each factor and that w ill 
constitute an ind iv idual1s score on a particu lar orientation to 
power.
Power as Good Power as Resource Dependency
Item: 5   (R) Item: 6________
16 J   7  ________
1 8 _______  (R) 19 _ _ _
32 ______  2 0 ________
37 _______  (R)
T o ta l: T o ta l: ___________
Power as Instinctive  Drive Power as P o litica l
Item: 11 _________________  Item: 2 8 ___
23 _______  40 _______
3 4 _______
T o ta l: T o ta l: __________
Power as Charisma Power as Control and Autonomy
Item: 2 4 _______  Item: 1 _______
32 _______  3  ______
12  ____
30
T o ta l: T o ta l:
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Table 13
Subjects' Raw Scores on the POS Pre- and Post-Test
Dimension Subject Ul U2 U3 Cl C2 C3
Good Pre 6 13 10 8 13 10
Post 6 15 9 8 9 12
Instinctive Pre -2 2 4 3 ‘  1 3
Drive Post 3 -3 4 3 8 6
Charisma Pre 3 4 4 -2 0 2
Post 0 3 2 -3 0 2
Resource Pre 9 8 - 9 2 2 6
Dependency Post 6 10 4 -1 4
P o litica l Pre 4 6 ' m 2 0 0 0
Post 4 6 2 0 -1 4
Control Pre 6 7 -12 3 -2 6
Autonomy Post 5 4 -11 4 -6 8
APPENDIX 2 
POST-SESSION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
PRE- AND POST-SIMULATION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
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What did you see as your main strengths and weaknesses?
What did you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the other 
team?
What about th is s ituation , i f  anything, helped you get what you 
wanted?
What factors worked in favor of the other team getting what they 
wanted?
How did you attempt to get your way in the bargaining session?
How did the other team act in attempting to get th e ir  way?
What did you do to influence the fin a l agreement?
What did the other team do to influence the fin a l agreement?
How could you te l l  a successful influence attempt from an 
unsuccessful one?
What did you do to counter an influence attempt by the other 
team?
How did you t e l l ,  as a bargainer, who has come out ahead on each 
point or issue?
(Post-session interview only) Did you have moves or strategies 
that you did not use fo r some reason? (What were they? Why 
d id n 't you use them?)
How would you describe the relationship between the two bargaining 
teams?
Divide the following "pies" to indicate your view of how each 
team fared or w ill fare in getting what they want on each issue
Example: C0=Company
UNOnion
WAGES TERM OF CONTRACT
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE LAYOFFS
130
10. Did you have enough information to play out th is simulation 
re a lis tic a lly ?
11. Do you think that the time lim ita tion  was overly restric tive?
12. How "re a lis tic "  would you say your bargaining behavior was; 
did you act lik e  you normally would at the table?
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APPENDIX 3 
THE BARGAINING SIMULATION
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CORN VALLEY LUMBER CORPORATION
VS -
INTERNATIONAL"LUMBER UNION
A Collective Bargaining Simulation 
by
John (Sam) Keltner
General Information
The Corn Valley Lumber Corporation owns and operates a number 
of sawmills, plywood plants, and paper mills in the Northwest. One 
of the major units is in Corn Valley, Oregon where i t  operates a 
sawmill and a veneer plant. I t  employs approximately 200 persons, at 
those two in sta lla tions , other .than the supervisory and management 
personnel.
The employees are represented by the International Lumber 
Union. The current contract is terminating on Wednesday, May 5, 
at 9:00 p.m. The parties have been negotiating the new contract for  
about three months. Several issues remain to be resolved. They 
are:
1. Wages
2. Term of the contract
3. Layoff procedure
4. Grievance procedures
Up until this time specific contractual terms for layoff and 
for grievance procedures have not been a part of the contract. The 
Union is now insisting that these matters become a part of the 
contractual agreement.
In the past three months the Company has shut down a number 
of i ts  m ills and plants across the country. The Corn Valley plant 
has not had a layoff as yet. There is , however, a good chance that 
i f  the housing and lumber industry does not improve shortly there 
w ill  be layoffs at the Corn Valley installations.
Almost a ll of the Corn Valley plants' employees l iv e  in or 
near Corn Valley. These plants are the principle income producing 
source for residents o f  the area. In other words, the area economy 
depends on these plants.
These negotiations are being closely watched by the residents 
of the area and surrounding areas.
At the last meeting of the negotiating teams both parties 
were unable to make much change in position. Up until the present 
time the Company has made no wage offer. The Union has requested
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30 percent wage increase due to in fla t ion  and the inequitable 
position of employees in these plants compared with the industry on 
the whole. The Company feels this is wholly impractical and has 
refused to make a wage proposal until the Union comes o ff its  
"impossible" position (Company a tt itu d e). The Union is afraid to 
move o f f  of i ts  position for fear that the Company w il l  take this 
as a sign of weakness and make only a token wage offer.
General Instructions
Because of the importance of this contract for the Valley, 
the local press has been very interested in the negotiations and 
is constantly asking for information and interviews. Last week a 
feature a r t ic le  appeared in the local paper te l l in g  of the stalemate 
in the negotiations and quoting interviews with both management and 
labor people. Both sides have resented this and there is some tension 
around the things alleged to have been said.
The next meeting of the bargaining teams is at 8:00 p.m., 
Wednesday, May 5.
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CORN VALLEY LUMBER SIMULATION
COMPANY
CONFIDENTIAL
Facts for the Company
--Because of the te rr ib le  condition of the;industry, the Company is 
facing a shutdown of the Corn Valley mills in the immediate future. 
Top management has already sent out orders to prepare timetables 
and schedules for a shutdown.
--This m i l l ,  however, has the lowest wage and Tabor costs of any of 
the mills run by the Company. For this reason the Company w ill 
close this m ill as a las t resort and w ill  open i t  up f i r s t  when 
the industry picks up. I f  the economic situation should change 
the Company would try  to keep the mill open.
- - I t  is estimated that the wage advantage o f the Corn Valley plants 
is approximately 20 percent under a l l  other m ills in the area of 
at least three states.
--Due to the recession the Company has lost a lo t  of its  market. I t  
s t i l l  has, however, a firm export market for dimension lumber and 
veneer. I t  is expected that this may support the continuation of 
the Corn Valley installations at about 50 percent capacity a fter  
about a four (4) week layoff, whenever that' layoff occurs.
--The Company does intend to make a wage offer but because i t  is 
much below what the Union is asking and what the cost of liv ing  
index indicates i t  has not been w ill in g , up to now, to put.that 
offer on the table.
--The Company would l ik e ,  of course, a long term contract at the 
reduced wage rates i t  feels i t  can afford to pay a t this time.
--The Company has looked at a number of layoff and grievance clauses 
and is prepared to make a proposal at the next meeting of the 
bargaining teams.
As representatives for the Company you must prepare yourselves on
the following matters:
1. Determine what wage rate you w ill  be w illing to o ffer and what 
rate you w ill be w illing to settle  on.
2. Determine the exact length of contract you w ill  accept.
3. Examine layoff clauses and select or word a clause that best 
f i t s  your situation. Be prepared to submit this to the Union 
at the bargaining session.
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4. Examine grievance clauses and select or word a clause that best
f i t s  your situation. Be prepared to submit this to the Union 
at the bargaining session only a fter  the Union has made its  
suggestions and i f  they are not acceptable to you.
5. Prepare your bargaining team, to handle the upcoming negotiation
session. Remember that i t  w ill be the las t session before the
contract expires.
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CORN VALLEY LUMBER SIMULATION
UNION
CONFIDENTIAL
Facts for the Union
—Due to the impending layoff there is a serious need to get a clear 
agreement as to the order and method of layoff and call back.
--Because of the in fla t ion  and the recession situation, the Union 
is fearful of any Tong term contract.
—Because of serious problems in layoff and recall there is a real 
need for a clear and effective grievance procedure.
--People in Corn Valley depend almost to ta l ly  on the CVL for income. 
When these plants go down, the area w ill  be in serious financial 
trouble. However, i t  does not cost as much to l iv e  in Corn Valley 
as in other areas of the state. The local paper recently reported 
that liv ing costs here were approximately 20 percent lower than in 
surrounding areas in the Northwest.
—Union membership has been increasing of late as fear of the 
shutdown grows.
--The Union started i ts  bargaining with a 30 percent wage increase 
proposal. The reason given was the wide difference in wages with 
other plants in the state and the cost of liv ing increase in the 
state. Even so, the Union realizes that this figure is not 
re a l is t ic  in many ways but i t  has been afraid to lower its  demand 
for fear the Company w il l  feel i t  is weak and w ill  whip-saw the 
Union to an impossibly low wage that w ill  force the Union to strike.
—The Union does not want a strike. Conditions at this time make i t  
very d i f f ic u l t  to support the strikers. However, i f  the Company 
does not come up with some reasonable proposals the workers w ill  
probably pull a wildcat strike. In that case the Union w ill  have 
to support the workers as best i t  can.
—Because of the serious economic situation, the Union is wary of any 
long term contract.
As representatives of the Union employees you must prepare yourselves
on the following matters:
1. Determine the wage rate you w ill be w illing  to f in a l ly  se ttle  on
and the stages you feel you w ill  have to go through to get there.
2. Determine the exact length of contract you w i l1. accept.
3. Examine layoff clauses and select or word a clause that best f i t s
your situation. Be prepared to submit this to the Company at 
the bargaining session.
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4. Examine grievance clauses and select or word a clause that best 
f i t s  your situation. Be prepared to submit this to the Company 
at the bargaining session and support your proposal with reasons 
for i ts  usefulness to both the Union and the Company.
5. Prepare your team for the upcoming bargaining session. Remember 
that i t  w ill be the las t session before the contract expires.
CORN VALLEY LUMBER SIMULATION
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The following are the possible settlement points on each issue you 
w il l  be negotiating. To the right of each option you w ill  see a 
column marked "Union" and a column marked "Company." You are to 
assign points to each option according to how desirable i t  is to 
your team. Assign points for your team only. You have 100 points 
to distribute among the options for each issue. For example, i f  you 
had four possible outcomes on the wage issue and each was less 
desirable than the one before i t  you might assign the points as 
follows:
Option 1 40 pts.
Option 2 30 pts.
Option 3 20 pts.
Option 4 10 pts.
Remember, you must assign exactly 100 pts. per issue and you are free 
to assign no points or even negative points to an option as long as 
the total adds up to 100.
Company Union
WAGES:
30% increase in wages________________ :_______  ____________
25% increase in wages      .
20% increase in wages________________________ ____________
15% increase in wages________________________  ____________
10% increase in wages_______________________ __________ _
5% increase in wages_____________________ ______ ___________
NO increase in wages________________________ _ ____________
TERM OF CONTRACT:
1 year contract
2 year contract
3 year contract
3 years with reopen on 
wages a fte r  18 months 
2 years with reopen on 
wages a fter  12 months
LAYOFFS:
No layoff clause 
Layoffs beginning with the 
least senior workers within 
each department without 
transfers 
Layoffs beginning with the 
least senior workers 
company-wide with transfers 
No layoffs until workers hours 
have been cut at least %. 
Workers have a choice of layoffs 
or reduced hours 
Layoffs by seniority in both 
labor and management ( i f ' ”' 
labor is cut 10%, mgt. must 
be cut 10%)
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE:
Grievances w il l  be taken through the following channels. 
(Joint Committee refers to a committee made up of 2 union repre­
sentatives and 2 company representatives).
Company Union
Foreman, Superintendent,
Personnel Director; NO 
Arbitration
Foreman, Superintendent, 
Personnel Director; then 
Arbitration but only at 
the .request of both parties
Foreman, Superintendent, 
Personnel Director; then 
Arbitration at either  
parties' request
•
Foreman, Superintendent, 
Joint Committee; NO 
Arbitration.
Foreman, Superintendent, 
Joint Committee, then 
Arbitration.
Foreman, Superintendent, 
Joint Commitee, mandatory 
Mediation in the Committee, 
then Arbitration.
NO Grievance Clause
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APPENDIX 4
RAW DATA FOR THE,SORTING AND CODING PROCEDURES
142
TACTICS EXTRACTED FROM THE POST-SIMULATION 
INTERVIEW TAPES
1. Speculate about how l ik e ly  a point is to be ra t i f ie d  (U3)*
2. Asking questions: "What did you mean...? (U2)
3. Insist on a liv ing  wage (U3)
4. Beating on the table (U3)
5. Calling o ff  the current bargaining session (U2)
6. Scream and ye ll while another team member is conciliating (U3)
7. Threaten an unfair labor practice suit (Ul)
8. Getting the other team to a l l  ta lk  or contribute (C2)
9. Be prepared to ta lk  when one comes to a session (U2)
10. Express the potential of a strike (U3)
11. Call a caucus (C3)
12. Blow cigar smoke at the other team (Cl)
13. Anticipation of the other team's moves (C2)
14. Hold out for as long as possible (U l, U2, U3)
15. Begin with non-money issues (Ul)
16. Make quick, a t-the-tab le  decisions--be decisive (C2)
17. Show experience in bargaining (C l, C2)
18. "Stomping" out of the room (C2)
19. Mention the existence of personal relationships with opposing 
bargainers (C2)
20. Keep the other team talking (C2)
21. Ask the other team to make a specific proposal out of a general
argument (a "matter o f  principle" argument) (C3)
22. Doodle (C2)
23. Show an understanding of information about the industry (Cl,
C3)
24. Mix antagonism with conciliation (one hostile member and one 
"nice" guy) (C3)
25. Squirm in one's seat (C3)
26. Do the unexpected--act contrary to one's reputation or normal 
patterns (C3)
27. Look away or look down—avoid eyexontact (C3)
28. Get the other team to put something in writing in a short 
amount of time (Cl)
29. Do the writing oneself (C2)
30. Ins is t on the other team making a counteroffer (C3)
31. Make large (numerical) concessions (C3)
32. Be clear about one's purpose or end-point goal (C3)
33. Use log ic-strong rational arguments (U2, U3)
34. Be open minded (C2)
35. Equalize contributions and decision-making authority (C3)
36. Focus—discuss points progressively more specifica lly  (Cl)
37. Indicate willingness to compromise (C2)
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38. Make a demand or request immediately followed by an o ffer to 
the other team (C2)
39. Suggest closure of the plant (Ul)
40. Talk about the time l im it  (U2)
41. Denounce an offer as an "insult" or "ludicrous" (U2)
*
Numbers in parentheses indicate the subject who suggested each tactic .
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TACTICS IDENTIFIED BY THE SUBJECTS DURING 
THE VIDEOTAPE VIEWING SESSION
1. Avoid eye contact (C2)*
2. Put one's pen away (C2)
3. Shake your head (C2)
4. "We w ill have no more movement on the contract whatsoever" (U3)
5. "We have given you more than we had planned on giving you coming 
into this bargaining session" (U3)
6. "We would double our wage offer at this point" (U3)
7. "The alternative might be a complete close down of the plant" 
(U3)
8. "You are saying to us 'higher wages is more important to us 
than keeping people working" (U3)
9. "Is i t  in your best interest to allow that?" (U3)
10. "Is that fair?" (U3)
11. "The alternative is probably closing down the p la n t ." (U3)
12. "No we absolutely could not accept that."  (U3)
13. Cite s ta tis tics  (U2, U3)
14. Look at your watch (U2)
15. "We only have 15 minutes until the contract expires." (U2)
16. "We do not rea lly  l ike  i t  but we are w illing  to l iv e  with 
i t . "  (U2)
17. "That is a pretty embarrassing proposal." (U2)
18. "We would be laughed right out of the union hall with that 
o ffe r ."  (U2)
19. "We have got to sell this idea to our constituents." (U2)
20. Extend the other side's own examples/reasoning so that i t  
appears unrealistic/rid iculous,(U2)
21. Turn the other side's own words against them (U2)
22. "You are getting paid more than people on unemployment." (Ul,
C2)
23. "We are not paid as much as other workers in this industry 
(or a re a )." (U l, C2)
24. "Is that the best you can do?" (C2)
25. Lower one's voice (C2)
26. "Are you saying that you are insensitive to your own people?" 
(C2)
27. Denounce the other sides's o ffer  as inadequate, ludicrous, 
etc. (U l, U2)
28. "We are closer to agreement but s t i l l  fa r  apart on (x ) ."  (Ul)
29. Take notes while others are talking (C2)
30. Interrupt (C2, U2)
31. Raise your voice (U2)
32. "That is the same argument we have been running into for
hundreds of years." (U2)
33. " I am a l i t t l e  offended by that o ffe r ."  (U2)
34. Rap the table with f i s t ,  palm, or finger (U2)
35. "We have no more movement a fte r  this o ffe r ."  (U2)
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36. "This o ffer exceeds our authority." (U2)
37. "We have given you (x) on (y) issue." (U2)
38. "We are as concerned as you are about (x ) ."  (U2)
39. "We are at the end of our rope." (U2)
40. "We.have some doubt as to whether we are going to have this 
contract ra t i f ie d ."  (U2)
41. "You w ill get what you want i f  you go along with our proposal." 
(U2)
42. "Without that we cannot go back, to our people w ith o u t  facing the 
probability of a wildcat s t r ik e ." (C2)
43. "I would like  to hear more about why you think (x) is ju s t if ie d ."  
(Ul)
44. "Are you rea lly  trying t o ' te l l  us (x ) ."  (U2)
45. Deny the other side's point--make them prove i t . ( U l )
*
Numbers in parentheses indicate the subject who identified  each 
tac tic .
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MATRICES OF AGREEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENT SORTS OF 
THE INTERVIEW AND VIDEOTAPE DATA
I-. Interview Data
Rater A
1 2 3
1 .15 .16b .02
Rater B 2 .05 .12 .28c
3 .08a .05 .10 '
abc = Best agreement between raters (.52)
a = Card numbers 5, 10,. and 39
b = Card numbers 14, 24, 26, 28, 30, and 38
c = Card numbers 2, 9, 13, 17, 19, 23, 32, ;
33, 34, 35, and 36
I I .  Video tape Data
Rater A 
1 2 3
1 .13 .18 .12c
Rater B 2 .02 .20b .08
3 .09a .08 .09
.abc = Best agreement between raters (.41)
a = Card numbers 7, 9, 10, and 11
b = Card numbers 1, 2, 3, 13, i4 , 21, 25,
31, and 34 
c = Card numbers 18, 19, 22, 23, and 32
MATRICES OF AGREEMENT FOR THE DATA SORTS BASED ON 
. RESEARCHER CONSTRUCTED CATEGORIES
Interview Data (CS1)
Rater A
Rater B
1 2 3 4
1 .26a* .03 .00 .00
2 .05 .13b* .00 .00
3 .03 .00 .08c* .03
4
: 71%
.05 .00 .11 .24d*
11,
21,
14,
15,
32,
29
17, 19 
33, 36
, 20, 23 , 34, 35, anc
6, 7, 10 , 12, 18, 22, 16, and 29
Videotape Data (CS2)
Rater A
Rater B
1 2 3 4 5
1 .18a* . 02 .02 .00 .04
2 .02 . l ib * .02 .90 .04
3 .00 .00 .11c* .00 .02
4 .00 .00 .00 . 21d* .00
5 .07 .02 .00 .00 . 13e*
*
Agreement =71%
a = Items 8, 9, 10, 13, 20, 43, 44, and 45
b = Items 4, 7, 12, 35, and 39
c = Items 6, 16, 28, 37, and 41
d = Items 1, 2, 3, 14, 25, 29, 30, and 31
e = Items 15, 17, 18, 22, 27, and 33
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FINAL CODING CATEGORIES (CS1)
I .  INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION:
^Indicate willingness to compromise
-Make equal contributions and distribute decision-making 
authority  
-Be open minded
-Show an understanding of information about the industry 
-Keep the other team talking
-Mention the existence of personal relationship with opposing 
bargainers 
-Show experience in bargaining 
-Begin with non-money issues 
-Call a caucus
-Get the other team to a l l  ta lk  and contribute
H .  INCREASE THE SPECIFICITY OF INFORMATION:
-Focus by discussing points progressively more specifically
-Use logic and strong rational arguments
-Be clear about one's own prupose or goal
-Ask the other team to be specific about a general argument
-Ask questions: , ("What.do you mean...?")
I l l ,  RESTRICT THE OTHER TEAM:
-Do the writing oneself
-Hold out for as long as possible
- In s is t  on a liv ing wage
IV. THROW OFF THE BALANCE OF THE PROCESS:
-Suggest closure of the plant
-Do the unexpected; go against your own patterns or reputation 
-Doodle
r̂ Stomp out of the room 
T -Blow smoke at the other team
-Mention the possib ility  of probability of a strike  
-Scream and ye ll while another member of your team conciliates 
-Call o ff  the current bargaining session 
-Beat on the table
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FINAL CODING CATEGORIES (CS2)
I .  LOGIC AND REASONING: Presenting one's own logic and reasoning;
challenging the other's examples and argument; questioning the 
other's logic, reasoning, or examples.
-"You are saying to us 'higher wages is more important to us 
than keeping people working."
-" Is  i t  in your best interest to allow that?"
-" Is  that fair?"
-Cite s ta tis tics
-Extend the other team's own examples/reasoning so that i t  
appears unrealistic or ridiculous.
- " I  would l ike  to hear more about why you think (X) is 
ju s t i f ie d ."
-"Are you rea lly  trying to te l l  us (X)?"
-Deny the other side's point--make them prove i t .
11• DEAD ENDS: Communicating in f le x ib i l i t y
-"We w ill  have no more movement on the contract whatsoever."
-"The alternative might be a complete close down of the plant."  
-"No we absulutely could not accept that."
-"We have no more movement a fter  this o ffer ."
-"We are at the end of our rope."
I I I .  GIVE AND TAKE: Exchanges, expressing or asking for cooperation;
exchanging concessions.
-"We would double our wage o ffer  at this point."
-"We do not rea lly  like  i t  but we are w illing to live  with i t . "  
-"We are closer to agreement but s t i l l  fa r  apart on (X)."
-"We have given you (X) on (Y) issue."
-"You w ill  get what you want i f  you go along with our 
proposal."
IV. POWER CUES: Nonverbal emphasis, responses, or d isinterest.
-Avoid’ eye contact
-Put your, pen away 
-Shake your Head.
-Lower one.'s voice
-Taking notes while other's are talking
-Rapping the table with f i s t ,  palm, or finger
-Interrupting
-Raising your voice
-Looking at your watch
V. PRESSURE TACTICS: Indicate that an o ffer  is unacceptable;
emphasize time pressure; insults.
-" I  am a l i t t l e  offended by that o ffer ."
-"We only have 15 minutes until the contract expires."
-Denounce the other side.'s o ffer as inadequate, ludricrous, etc. 
-"You are getting paid more than people on unemployment."
-"We would be laughed right out of the union hall with that o ffe r ."  
-"That is a pretty embarrassing proposal."
-  ■ . 1  —....... .................................. .— -- ---------- ------- - i-
I .  MAXIMIZE INFORMATION & 
KNOWLEDGE:
Increase the amount of 
info; exhibit experience 
and existence of personal 
relationships with members, 
of the other team
I I .  BE SPECIFIC:
Increase the specific ity  
of info; get clear on the 
arguments and issues in 
question
I I I .  RESTRICT THE OTHER TEAM: 
Be in flex ib le  and 
uncooperative
IV. THROW OFF THE BALANCE: 
Confuse, pressure, or 
distract the other 
team; introduce abrupt 
changes in patterns or 
norms
Figure 4
Coding Sheet fo r  CS1
I .  LOGIC & REASONING:
Giving your own L & R; - 
challenging the other's' 
examples and arguments; 
questioning the ir  logic
I I .  DEAD ENDS: '
Communicating in f le x ib i l i t y :
I I I .  GIVE & TAKE:
Expressing and/or asking 
for cooperation; exchanging 
concessions
*
*
IV. POWER CUES:
Nonverbal emphasis, response 
or disinterest
V. PRESSURE TACTICS:
Indicate that an offer  
is unacceptable; emphasize 
time pressure; use emotional 
argument
Figure 5
Coding Sheet fo r  CS2
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